

THE STATE AS A FOCUS OF PEACE RESEARCH¹

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The purpose of this paper is two-fold: it attempts to challenge those engaged in Peace Research today to reflect upon the framework of their intellectual efforts, to ask questions which seem to be suppressed, forgotten, or ignored by an increasingly prosperous and fashionable field of the social sciences-and it tries to establish the direction in which these questions might find answers. The implicit and explicit problem this paper tries to tackle is the political relevance of this particular academic enterprise called Peace Research. At the outset, I would like to establish a few short premises¹ before developing my subject proper.

1) Peace Research is not concerned with peace in an abstract way, but is concerned with structures, power, and interests in the empirical world. Peace Research deals with a certain type of peacelessness and is not concerned with the elimination of every conceivable type of violence and/or conflict of interests.

2) Historically, the origins of Peace Research can be traced back to World War 1, which was followed by the emergence of an academic discipline called "International Relations" as well as by the rapid growth of movements and of public opinion demanding a new policy of peace among nations (this is not to ignore the tradition of "peace proposals" in the history of law and philosophy-but these schemes are irrelevant as far as the development of social science as a science is concerned). World War 1 stimulated Peace Research-largely in the disguise of International Relations-as an effort to understand the origins of war and to discover means for preventing the future outbreak of another war-not because people had become pacifist through this particular experience, but rather because a certain type of war had turned out to be counterproductive.

3) The particular type of war that had become counterproductive was the one that had its origin in the emergence of the territorial nation-state (born with the French Revolution). The nation-state proved capable of mobilizing into a mutually destructive political effort not only masses of people, but the combined achievements of national economies and technologies as well. In other words, it was the war between nation-states or just states that gave birth to the study of international relations in general and to a more consciously value- or goal-oriented Peace Research in particular, even if we find the term itself first accepted 20 years after the second such war in human history.

4) Peace Research either never really reflected upon its own historical origins and its sociological position within an historical context, or it has suppressed such

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¹ For reasons of convenience, I omit the customary scholarly references to this brief survey.

reflections under the overwhelming influence of the a-historical and a-sociological social science of American origin which is dominant in most Western countries. The emancipation of Peace Research from its historical origins-the primary concern with violent conflict between states-has led, or seems to be leading, towards a field of scholarship that lacks definition of scope and focus; one is tempted to say "almost anything goes" today under the label of Peace Research. Even the most superficial glance at the topics of papers presented at conferences or collected in books, as well as at the individuals who discover Peace Research today in order to sell their same old intellectual commodities in a new wrapping, would bear out this observation. And secondly, the emancipation of Peace Research from its social origins-the relationship, however uneasy, with groups in opposition to the existing socio-political systems-has led, or seems to be leading, towards the emergence of a profession that produces either a mass of irrelevant findings or, more important, that makes itself available for manipulation by the establishments, the "*classe politique*," the national security bureaucrats of individual countries. This is so because, for reasons to be discussed later, Peace Research has never really asked the question: Which are the social, the politically organized or organizable agents to bring about those changes in the international social system which are necessary to destroy the conditions that have been breeding wars in the past and are responsible for the present war- or threat-system today?

A few historical reminiscences about the political organization called the "state", the focus of our concern, are in order. As Max Weber has pointed out with great clarity and precision: the state as an institution based upon rationality and efficiency of performance is both a product of Western society and a relatively new, historically unprecedented phenomenon; we cannot compare it, for example, with the Chinese ancient regime or with the forms of political organization that were prevalent during the Middle Ages in Western Europe.² Similarly, the political sociologist Hermann Heller insists upon "the historical consciousness of the fact that the state as a concept as well as a reality is something historically unique, indeed, and cannot, as this modern individuality, be smuggled into earlier periods."³

As far as the concept is concerned, it was not until the emergence of bureaucratically structured administrations under the tutelage of princes and kings in their successful fight against feudal prerogatives during the 17th century, that the term "state" began to acquire its modern meanings of efficiency, rationality and territorial integrity. Until then it was used mainly to describe the court or the personal entourage of a prince without any implication of potentially all-embracing organization and control.⁴ As far as the reality is concerned, this particular institution or form of political organization came into existence as a function of the beginnings of capitalist industrialization. Capitalist monetary policies allowed the emancipa-

² Max Weber, *Staatssoziologie*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1956; p. 17ff.

³ Hermann Heller, *Staatslehre*. Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1934; p. 125.

⁴ Paul-Ludwig Weinacht, *Staat. Studien zur Bedeutungsgeschichte des Wortes*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1968.

tion of territorial rulers from their dependence upon feudal lords,⁵ and provided them with the means for the establishment of large standing armies. These armies required planning and a rational bureaucracy, which in turn encouraged and strengthened commercial, capitalist enterprise to secure and broaden the power base of the court. Max Weber is unmistakably clear about the interdependence of the development of capitalism and the modern, rational state with its bureaucratic structure.⁶ Others, like Werner Sombart, have shown in early case studies and independently of Max Weber, the interdependence of the establishment of standing armies and the emergence of capitalism, both always requiring a strong element of central, bureaucratic planning and control.⁷ To secure and guarantee domestic tranquility and stability - "law and order" - has been one of the most important functions of the new state organization. It is not by accident, therefore, that all through the 18th and 19th centuries, academic-scholarly concern with and writing about the state bore the label of "police science": the science of how to police a quiet, legal, uninterrupted life for a society organized to produce. The emergence of a largely urban-based middle class of entrepreneurs and artisans who would profit from the state-guaranteed law and order made this possible, when in order to break the resistance of feudal landlords, the kings and princes allied themselves with those emerging middle classes and created a powerful bureaucracy.⁸ To point out the social or class content of the emergence of the modern state is of the greatest importance. It was again Max Weber who laid great stress upon the fact that violence-i.e., mediated forms of suppression-lay at the roots of this modern state despite its rationality and its principles of regularity and efficiency. He defines the state as "that human community which claims successfully within a specific territory ... the monopoly of legitimate physical violence."⁹ The origin of those preconditions which later allowed the formation of the modern state lies in the domination of one class or group over other classes or groups by means of physical subjugation. Anthropologists have largely confirmed the so-called "conquest theory" of the origin of the state:¹⁰ even though there are exceptions, it was usually through the suppression by means of military conquest, of tribes and people of different culture or race, that the foundations were laid for the institutionalization of inequalities into all-embracing state organizations which preserved those inequalities in different and more mediated-indirect-forms. In more recent times, this "ideal type" development can be studied in the foundation of African states. First Western missionaries and then the colonial powers forced tribal, non-territorial societies into permanent "reserves" in order to render them more

⁵ Heller, *op. cit.*; p. 133.

⁶ Weber, *op. cit.*

⁷ Werner Sombart, *Krieg und Kapitalismus*. Muenchen und Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1913.

⁸ Henry Jacoby, *Die Buerokratisierung der Welt*. Berlin: Luchterhand, 1969; pp. 47 and 73.

⁹ Weber, *op. cit.*; p. 27.

¹⁰ I. Schapera, *Government and Politics in Tribal Societies*. New York: Schocken, 1967; pp. 126 ff.; and Lucy Mair, *Primitive Government*. Penguin Books, 1962; p. 125.

controllable¹¹ and to integrate them into their economies-to transform them into production units. Similarly, the long history of class relations, exploitation, and institutionalized suppression can be traced back to military conquests and physical domination by means of violence.¹² To sum up so far: 1) the state is historically a rather recent phenomenon; 2) the modern state emerged together with capitalist industrialization; 3) even in its mediated, rationalized and bureaucratic forms, states are founded upon inequality and the suppression of some classes by other classes by means of legitimized violence.

The state, however, is not identical with the narrower concept or the more specific form of the nation-state. Rather, the nation-state is one particular mode of state organization perhaps the currently dominant one-in which the salient feature is territoriality. Nationalism as one strong possibility for the ideological rationalization or "superstructure" of state organization grew out of the need of ruling groups or classes to strengthen their power position. "It was everywhere the warrior-class, the nobility, which, though partly of foreign stock, first developed a sense of nationality; and the kings who laid the foundations of modern national states did so largely with a view to using the expected increase in power for creating an empire."¹³ In other words, the idea that nations-people with identical or similar languages, customs, traditions, etc.-organized themselves quasi-organically into nation-states does not correspond to reality. It was rather the states as the instruments of ruling groups and classes that created their nations. It has been pointed out, for example, that languages have a natural tendency towards centrifugality, while a common language is always the product of conscious political-administrative decisions to improve bureaucratic efficiency and legal control mechanisms.¹⁴ If the administrative, the military and, most important, the socioeconomic base for such national unification in terms of language is missing or weak, we might observe a prolongation or even a reversal of the state centralization efforts in "nation-building" as, for example, in India. If, on the other hand, these basic conditions are strong enough, a state might very well exist and function efficiently even with diverse languages within a given territory as, for example, in Switzerland or Yugoslavia. Thus, it is not nations as such that find in state organization, on the basis of a common territory, their most adequate means or instruments of emancipation from earlier forms of political organization. Rather it is the early bourgeoisie, originated from capitalism, that by means of the creation of states emancipated itself from feudalism. Thus, the German historian Theodor Schieder calls the rebellion of the "General States of the Northern Netherlands" (the Utrecht Union of 1581) the "first revolutionary act of state foundation

¹¹ Schapera, *op. cit.*; p. 13.

¹² Summary with further bibliographical references in Ernest Mandel, *Marxistische Wirtschaftstheorie*. Frankfurt : Suhrkamp, 1968; Ch. I.

¹³ Frederick Hertz, *Nationality in History and Politics*. New York: Humanities Press, 1950; p. 154.

¹⁴ Cf. Mario Pei, *The Italian Language*; New York, 1941; and by the same author, *The Story of Language*; Philadelphia, 1949; as quoted by Walter Sulzbach, *Imperialismus und Nationalbewusstsein*. Frankfurt: Europaeische Verlagsanstalt, 1959; pp. 80 ff.

in modern European history" and he sees the American claim for self-determination of 1776 not as a national, but as a natural-rights claim (natural rights being the ideological weapon against divine, feudal rights), the "basic document for all emancipatory acts of state foundations ... in the modern world."¹⁵ It is only later that state and nation are identified with each other to give the state a new and more effective legitimacy over its less sophisticated but basically real function of class domination and social stratification for the purposes of capitalist production. During the last two centuries by the effective manipulation of symbols,¹⁶ the sovereign state became the supreme symbol of emancipation, for liberal-democratic, national, and-in most recent times, due to something that one might call an "ideological spill-over effect"-anti-colonialist social revolutions as well.¹⁷

If we insist on the non-identity of the state and the nation-state-the latter being just one specific type of the former-and if we insist, furthermore, that it is territoriality that constitutes the most important external characteristic of this political organization, we must also insist for the purposes of our inquiry upon another structural element that goes together with territoriality, bureaucratic rationality, the legality of administration, and the development of capitalism; namely, the concomitant character of army and state, which had been mentioned earlier only in passing. Any careful historical-sociological analysis will confirm the observation that "the modern large nations have been mainly formed by wars, partly by conquest, partly by fusion under the menace of conquest".¹⁸ Thus the modern state can be equally described as being the product of the standing army, (which required a military bureaucracy and system of acquisition, supply, and logistics)¹⁹, reversing the usual manner of description. To put it into more fashionable, modern terms: the military-industrial complex is the very midwife of the modern state and has never ceased to be its godfather and sponsor. The state, being born out of conquest, (i.e., suppression in a territorially defined context) and the military organization in alliance with industrialization and the bourgeoisie, formed a qualitatively new basic unit of international politics with a multitude of new features (diplomacy, subversion, economic warfare), of which I want to single out only one: the new military warfare.

During all our recorded history, there has been warfare and violent conflict, the study of which-initiated mainly by Quincy Wright but particularly flourishing since the 1960's-has led to the seemingly scientific confirmation of an age-old belief; i.e., that wars are an intrinsic part of human history. This in turn tends to support those who believe that it is, therefore, impossible to eliminate them from human affairs. Others have been arguing from the same premise that this could and should not serve as a rationalization for fatalism and that there is no reason

¹⁵ Theodor Schieder, *Zum Problem des Staatenpluralismus in der modernen Welt*. Koeln und Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1969; pp. 14 f.

¹⁶ Harold Lasswell, *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*; p. 19.

¹⁷ Schieder, *op. cit.*; p. 47.

¹⁸ Hertz, *op. cit.* ; p. 217.

¹⁹ Besides Sombart, cf. Otto Hintze, *Staat und Verfassung*. Goettingen, 1962.

why the time wouldn't come for this age-old institution to become outdated and outmoded. Both lines of reasoning are equally wrong, or rather, irrelevant. What tends to be overlooked in the process is the most important fact that not all wars are equally wars just as the modern state cannot be compared to earlier forms of organized political communities-and that those wars fought since the emergence of the modern state are qualitatively different from those fought, for example, in the Middle Ages. The latter had more the character of personal feuds between individual rulers or aristocratic cliques and left the masses of the people usually undisturbed and uninvolved-which was an economic necessity, given the agricultural base of pre-industrial politics.²⁰ One might go back even further and look into anthropological studies which state, for example, "that what is found characteristic of primitive, stateless societies are forms of armed aggression-fighting, homicide, feud-in which involvement and motivation is deeply personal, and what is not found in such societies is organized offensive warfare to conquer people or territory, with its essentially impersonal involvement and lack of personal motivation.... Evidently, conquest warfare and its modern development of war to advance national interests is not an inherent, inevitable feature of human life-too many societies have existed in human history without it." This author concludes with the question: "Is modern war inherent and inevitable in the modern form of state political organization?" and answers it without being specific by pointing in the direction of the line of argument presented here, that "the state as we know it must be changed. ..."²¹ For the purpose of forcing Peace Research into a better and more precise understanding of itself, of its own historical genesis and thus for the purpose of challenging its disciples to clarify their own scope and priorities, it should be pointed out again, as it was mentioned at the beginning, that Peace Research came into existence as a reaction to World War I.

World War I was that war which demonstrated and practiced for the first time to the fullest degree possible the new type of warfare which constituted the genesis of the modern state itself. World War I was not an aberration, a tragic mistake but rather a mistake that had its own rationale and logic-the logic of this modern state itself. Already the great ideologues of the modern state and its sovereignty, Bodin and Hobbes, had observed very clearly that the price paid for internal peace - the social stratification and pacification of society-was the increase in the level of international war and the intensification of inter-state violence.²² The main characteristic of modern war has to be seen in the collective and total mobilization of violence organized within the framework of the bureaucratic industrial state. War as a permanent possibility and warfare as a practiced reality were and still are the very backbone of territorially based state organizations, the first full application of which was witnessed during World War I. In the aftermath of this war, those concerned with Peace Research in the guise of International Relations had been

²⁰ John U. Nef, *War and Human Progress*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1963.

²¹ Alexander Lesser, *War and the State*. In: Morton Fried *et al.* (eds.) *War-The Anthropology of Armed Conflict and Aggression*. Garden City, N.Y.: Natural History Press, 1968; pp. 95 f.

²² Cf. the article on Sovereignty, in: *The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*.

partly aware of this fact without being willing or intellectually able to follow their own observations and insights to their logical political conclusion. Their incomplete, premature answer has not really been improved since then: it is still believed that what we need is a League of Nations, or a United Nations, or some forms of peaceful state interactions or integration, be they regional or global. It was not seen and is still not seen that it is the modern state itself that has to be made the focus of concern-and intellectual and/or political attack. And, for the sake of its own integrity as a distinct, progressive, and useful discipline, Peace Research must attack.

In the most vital area of sovereignty, armaments, the League of Nations was unable to affect its member states. This is quite logical, we should add, because it could not tackle the very roots of state power: centralized organization, capitalism, and military bureaucracy. The Soviet-Socialist attempt to break out of the vicious circle of territorial state organization as the allegedly inevitable and rational form of modern politics has failed very badly. With capitalism preserved outside Russia, the young revolutionary government found itself in a life-or-death struggle for survival within a hostile environment. It resurrected-initially as a temporary measure-inherited bureaucratic state functions and eventually produced that Soviet Union which today turns a reading of Lenin's *State and Revolution* into something like a bad joke. We will have to come back to this point. Contrary to the more idealistic expectations and assumptions of liberal democrats in the West, Democracy and Constitutionalism were irrelevant to the prevention of war. To put it into general terms: in the course of the preservation of established interests, the likelihood of the resort to war, war-like or military actions is independent of the social content or of the constitutional form of societies organized as states. "States with different constitutions have tended to react similarly under similar external pressures"²³ or, to quote again Quincy Wright, "statistics can hardly be invoked to show that democracies have been less often involved in war than autocracies."²⁴ The wealth of sophisticated and detailed research being done since these hypotheses were put forward a quarter of a century ago has more than confirmed these observations and related hypotheses regarding the relationship between domestic socio-psychological variables and aggressive foreign behaviour. (see work by Michael Haas)²⁵ If anything, a certain causal relationship between size of states and involvement in war has been suggested²⁶ - Even if, at first sight, such a connection tends to be only a scholarly confirmation of more traditional, "practical" knowledge, it might serve as a reminder of Montesquieu's observation of 300 years ago that it is size of states that breeds despotism and war and that only in small states might lie the chance for civil liberties and international peace.²⁷

²³ Quincy Wright, *A Study of War* (abr. ed.); University of Chicago Press, 1964, p. 157.

²⁴ *Op. cit.*; p. 161.

²⁵ Michael Haas, "Societal Approaches to the Study of War." *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 2, 1965; pp. 207 ff.

²⁶ Wright, *op. cit.* ; pp. 252 ff.

²⁷ Montesquieu, *L'Esprit des Lois*; VIII, 16-20; IX, 1-6.

From this vantage point, we should come to a rather sober assessment of trans-national integration movements or attempts. This is true particularly in relation to West European unity, which seems to be moving slowly but with logical consistency towards its own completion, which may take another ten or twenty years. One might—and usually does—consider European integration as an important step forward, overcoming age-old rivalries, narrow nationalisms and the breeding of two world wars, and setting a precedent for other regional integrations. Most of the studies done are explicitly or implicitly concerned exactly with these exemplary features of "functionalism in practice" and the workings of the "spillover effect".²⁸ We have to point out, however, that the kind of United Europe that we are likely to get is nothing but the reproduction of society organized as a state on a higher level with all the characteristics of the smaller nation-state units preserved, if not strengthened: centralization of bureaucratic power, legitimized violence for the preservation of existing social strata or classes, representative political bodies, hierarchical political parties and, last but not least, a strong military-industrial complex. It will not be a Europe "of the people" but rather a Europe brought about by powerful bureaucracies, serving the interests of capitalist industries, of better production and more consumption, and of preserving economic power and those privileges vis-a-vis the Third World particularly, that had been gained during the last century. Certainly, it will be a United Europe that plays its role as a guarantor of international order and stability with more vigor and consistency than at present, thus complementing the American efforts and, partly, the Soviet Union's as well.

It is not my intention to introduce a more vulgar element of political speculation into the scholarly discussion. Rather, we should apply and work with the concepts of the "threat system" as characterizing the present international order (Kenneth Boulding)²⁹, or of "peacelessness" as seen from the vantage point of the Third World (Sugata Dasgupta)³⁰, or of "*Organisierter Unfrieden*" (Dieter Senghaas).³¹ What we have to come to terms with is the existence of a state of "peace" on the macro-level of big-bloc international relations and the simultaneous spread of violence on what might be called the micro-level, that is, at the fringes of the international system. Unfortunately, this state of affairs makes a good deal of work being done in peace research rather irrelevant—that research, namely, that is still trying to prevent the outbreak of World War III by fighting against it, in a scholarly fashion, as if it were World War I or II. That often alluded-to World War III will, in all probability, never take place. In actuality, we are already in the middle of World War IV: the war against international inequality, poverty, exploitation,

²⁸ E.g. the studies in: *International Political Communities-an Anthology*; Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1966.

²⁹ Kenneth Boulding, "Toward a Theory of Peace." In: Roger Fisher (ed.) *International Conflict and Behavioral Science*. New York: Basic Books, 1964, pp. 70 ff.

³⁰ Sugata Dasgupta, "Peacelessness and Maldevelopment." In *Proceedings of the International Peace Research Association, Second Conference, Vol. II*. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1968; pp. 19 ff.

³¹ Dieter Senghaas, *Abschreckung und Frieden*. Frankfurt: Europaische Verlagsanstalt, 1968.

imperialism - or in reverse, the repressive war for the maintenance of socio-economic and bureaucratic privileges conducted by the West as well as by the East and successfully forced upon large parts of the South as well. The extremely difficult but equally important task that peace research has to tackle consists in the analysis of the interdependence of the processes of socio-economic stabilization and pacification domestically within the Great Blocs on the one hand, and the simultaneous spread of civil violence within them and at their "fringes" in the Third World on the other hand. In his theoretical essay on structural violence, Johan Galtung has made a useful conceptual attempt to demonstrate that violence-whether latent or manifest (the aspects of latent violence are without doubt the most important and generally overlooked ones) is a function of inequality in given social structures.³² For the sake of clarity, we might simplify Galtung's argument and reduce it to the lowest common denominator: violence is always present in those institutional arrangements that allow for or sanctify social inequality in terms of access to or control over resources of human productivity. It is irrelevant whether or not this violence manifests itself openly at a given place or time. The chance for peace lies, consequently, in all those steps that either reduce or overcome inequality systems in economics, politics, law, or whatever. If we follow Galtung's argument and put some flesh on its theoretical skeleton by referring to what I tried to point out earlier about the state as a political organization, we might say: that modern institution called the state represents the most sophisticated form of organized inequality to date, seemingly stable because it is internalized. Thus, we are back at the point Max Weber had made so long ago-that the state and violence are synonymous-but we have added the important new dimension of social inequality as being equally synonymous with violence and the modern state.

The Hobbes-Bodin observations about the higher level of international violence being the price paid for domestic pacification can be rephrased, therefore, for our times without losing their basic validity: the increase of violence in new, historically unprecedented forms is the direct function of inter-bloc stability and social pacification within the big industrial powers, which in turn was and still is only possible by means of strengthening state forms of political organization-be it of the American, the Soviet or an emerging United European type. There is no doubt that the present pathological international system, better to be called a system of organized disorder, is being maintained only because of the existence of organized states. These states are domestically legitimized through internalization, but serve the interests of a bureaucratic elite in the Soviet Bloc countries and of the capitalist mode of production in the Western countries. If-as a purely hypothetical construct-the societies of Asia and Latin America were left to themselves, i.e., without a Vietnam or a Guatemala, we would have a quite different world today and one that probably would be considerably less lopsided and unequal than the one that we have, which is being preserved through latent and manifest means of physical, state-organized violence. The so-called Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be properly understood without its context of historical, as well as current Western,

³² Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.": *Journal of Peace Research*, 1969.

capitalist Imperialism, just as the foundation of a Jewish state is the direct result of the emergence of state disciplining in Europe which made the Jews functionally homeless. The emergence of state organizations in Africa is equally the offspring of colonial policies of domination and improved administrative control and has already led to a Biafra, as well as to numerous border and other state-conflicts, with more of them likely in the future. These rather sketchy observations could and should be turned into thorough analyses—for our purposes, however, it must suffice to state the basic points. As important as it is to analyze - and to criticize the frightening rate of increase in horizontal arms trade and militarization in the Third World,³³ there should be no doubt about the fact that this process is only being sped up by the big power competition and is not a function of it. Rather we should say that, state organization and a military-industrial complex being synonymous, the armament of Third World countries is a function of their own political organization - once forced upon them but now emancipated from its historical origin and developing along lines allegedly without alternative.

While an in-depth analytical or generally empirical description of war-like violence in the present international system could be pursued ad infinitum, it might be more important to add a brief look at the other side of the state syndrome. Even and especially within the stable, wealthy, welfare-state societies, student-police confrontations, wildcat strikes, acts of "political vandalism," police brutality, rising crime rates, etc., are phenomena which require a rather complex system of analytical tools and which seem to originate in each case from rather specific circumstances and roots. However we might discover patterns and explanations for these phenomena that force us to take account of them within the framework of peace research in general and within the study of international relations with the objective of achieving a more peaceful system in particular. The reemergence of seemingly irrational acts of violence within the context of the modern, efficiency-oriented state has to be seen as a reaction to the state organization itself, which attempts to streamline societies into hierarchical structures, at the bottom of which lie inequalities and mediated forms of violence—the "structural violence" Galtung had been talking about. Whether we call this "Neo-Stalinism" in the East or the process of "involution" in the Western liberal democracies or the militarization of Third World domestic politics—there is one basic pattern in common: 1) the increasing restriction of the channels of political mass participation for the sake of adjusting politics to the necessities of the economy, society, and production within defined territorial or regional borders; 2) the attempts to narrow down "legitimate" or "reasonable" socio-political activity to either organized party or parliamentary politics, designed to strengthen state functions; and 3) the reaction of large, vocal minorities against these strategies and their implicit social or class content. We would see only one side of the coin if we were to analyze the international system as pathological or organized peacelessness and overlook the fact that the dialectical counterpart is the maintenance and strengthening of the units of this system, which are pathological and based upon organized disorder themselves. One is

³³ SIPRI Yearbook 1968/69. Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell, 1969; pp. 45 ff.

the function of the other-but in order to start the complex process of untying the knot of this interdependence, we have to begin with the structure of these units themselves and not with the international system. The point of attack-or of action-for peace research lies here, even if the dangers and malfunctions of the system are or have been in the past more easily visible and more obvious on the international level in terms of the arms race, atomic warfare, or imperialism.

Thus as was pointed out initially, we need to specify clearly the audience or the socio-political agents with whom peace research wants to identify in order to achieve its purposes. From all that has been said so far, it is obvious that the target audience of peace research cannot, by definition, be the operators of the system itself: the foreign policy officials, the politicians, the military strategists and bureaucrats. But similarly, peace research cannot address itself to an unspecified public at large, "public opinion" or the scholarly world. Rather, peace research has to concern itself very specifically with the problem of identifying those groups, classes or strata that are more likely than not to have a vested interest in overcoming or destroying the state organization of society-or, to put it more properly, who are underprivileged by the existing state systems both domestically and internationally. To be sure, the term "underprivileged" will have to be used in a very sophisticated manner and cannot be applied exclusively to those objectively at the bottom of the social ladder. It is certainly significant when an Indian scholar, reflecting upon the fact that there is no peace research in his or in other Third World countries, comes to the conclusion that the equivalent there is "development research" or rather "maldevelopment research".³⁴ Here peace research finds its social and political roots specified and its scholarly results might, therefore, become relevant. But this is only a timid beginning pointing in the right direction. By and large peace research is still a science in search of its public, having lost or forgotten this public after its meteoric resurrection during the last decade or less.

In his essay on the future of the international system, Johan Galtung has pointed out certain tendencies in the development of professional groups that might lead to the overcoming of state identifications, which are replaced functionally by organizational identifications.³⁵ This might be another starting point worth investigating, and it might be worth asking whether there is a political, change oriented potential involved. One might point out that business is possibly the greatest destroyer of parochial state politics and the most international of all organized human enterprises. This certainly needs a most careful investigation. However, it should be stated very strongly that the capitalist economy, exactly because of its internationalism, today more than ever needs the power of the state apparatus-military, diplomatic and legal-as a firm base domestically as well as for its international integration and exploitation. To make the world safe for business lies, after all, at the roots of most of the current wars that we are talking about, and at the roots of unequal development or underdevelopment as well. We should

³⁴ Dasgupta, *op. cit.* ; p. 30.

³⁵ Johan Galtung, "The Future of the International System." In *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 4, 1967; pp. 305 ff.

say, then, that those political forces opposing international capitalism are probably the most important and most relevant potential allies of peace research and peace praxis. They are not only identifiable but also desperately in need of a concept of a new international order. At this point most of them think only or primarily in terms of non-capitalist national states, a tragic shortsightedness if we consider the consequences that such ignoring of the international environment has had in the past on similarly enthusiastic revolutionary, humanitarian, or visionary attempts at modern revolutions.

This brings us back to one subject mentioned earlier only in passing: the history of the Soviet Union. It is well known that the Soviet Revolution set out to be an international one and inspired by the writings of Marx, expected with the total collapse of highly developed capitalism also the collapse of an international order based upon sovereign states in rivalry and competition with each other. We all know what has become of that attempt which once inspired millions of idealists and political realists all over the world. But the utter failure of this part of the communist program should not be seen as stemming from inherent contradictions or inconsistencies. Rather we should analyse the reemergence of state power and state organization in the Soviet Union as the result of its encirclement, as the result of a bitter struggle for survival in a world environment hostile to this revolution, consisting of states whose ruling classes were able to manipulate successfully collective identifications with the symbols of state sovereignty. The successful breaking of the backbone of international socialism by the bourgeois nation states turned out, as is visible to everybody regardless of his political persuasion a Pyrrhic victory: European Fascism sprang from it as well as World War II, the Cold War, the arms race, and all the rest.... However, we can observe today new movements of international solidarity, starting with the common opposition to the American war against the various liberation movements and developing more and more into fundamental opposition to the existing state structures, so capable of organizing these world-wide repressions for which they are [responsible](#). It should be pointed out that such opposition is not limited to the Western countries but is growing within the Soviet Bloc countries as well; and all of them have, at least as far as one can judge at this relatively early point of a long-range trend in their programmatic and ideological orientations, much more in common with each other than separates them. Their mutual enemies-the establishments concerned with law and order-call them quite correctly "anarchists" and anarchists they are, indeed, insofar as they refuse to accept the contradiction between the potentials of economic welfare and human richness and the actual organizational framework which impedes the full development of these potentials. Technological development has made it more than ever a realistic goal to transform politics from the dominance of man over man into the administration of things on the basis of solving the ageold problem of fulfilling basic needs through the socialization of the means of production.

With such a reorientation of peace research along specific political lines would go the necessity not to keep inventing new models of international order, but to

focus its energies on models of basic social order and on the new forms of political organization needed for societies that have solved the problems of scarcity. All those honorable efforts to overcome or destroy nationalism through the introduction of new educational devices, through more or better history, through increasing international contacts, etc. are hopelessly wrong, if they do not realize that the focus of concern is the state, rather than the nation. The state is bound to reproduce new forms of collective identifications if it is left intact but only changed in content of narrow geographical-territorial composition. The Soviet Union should serve as a case in point. Will we always need political mass parties and if so, based on which criteria? Or is not, perhaps, political mass organization doomed to develop such structures of bureaucratic domination that would make emancipation eventually fail again by creating dividing lines for unproductive or counterproductive conflicts? Do we need representative bodies like parliaments? Or does not the history of parliamentarism or representation show that this has been one of the main socializing agents for the nation-state and for keeping the people away from the centers of power, of decision-making and from self-determination on functional lines?³⁶ Maybe such models should be explored by studying the history-and failure-of the various anti-state movements in Europe, at least,³⁷ and possibly also in China. It seems to me no accident that quite independently of each other, but obviously responding to similar challenges, the theory and praxis of various council, Raete, or Soviet experiments have become a topic of prime concern among the different serious "protest movements" on all continents today. Again, peace research so far has completely ignored this important dimension of developing models for social organization at the grassroots level where, after all, the foundation of politics lies. It has become fashionable to make references to Immanuel Kant, the German philosopher who was one of the first to concern himself very seriously with the problems of international peace beyond simply designing another grand scheme for the ultimate benefit of just his own country or dynasty.³⁸ Kant, however, arguing for republican government, saw the plurality of states as the main source of wars and international disorder, which could only be mitigated and modified through international law; to him a World State was not the solution, but rather a non-state pluralism of races, religions, and cultures. Again, peace research has largely ignored such old but profound insights by cutting itself off from its historical dimension and by asking only those narrow questions that seem to yield faster, operational results.

Let me finish at this point without coming to a more specific conclusion than already presented all through this paper. Admittedly, it has raised more questions than it could possibly answer while not raising others that should be discussed. Furthermore, it, made more general statements and almost irresponsible generalizations than could possibly be substantiated in this context. Thus, it does set itself quite apart from a good deal of research and argument usually presented within

³⁶ Hertz, *op. cit.*; pp. 211

³⁷ Jacoby, *op. cit.*; pp. 276 ff.

³⁸ Cf. F. H. Hinsley, *Power and the Pursuit of Peace*. Cambridge, 1963; Part I.

the framework of peace research, and from the unwritten rules of careful, empirical scholarship. However, peace research as a field and enterprise (to which I have committed a good deal of my own energies) seems to me at a point where, as a German proverb says, it loses sight of the forest by focusing on the trees. Peace research is in urgent need to focus again on the forest, i.e., to see the whole of its object and to go to its roots.