

MINORITIES, VIOLENCE, AND PEACE RESEARCH*

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1. A tour d'horizon of the problem

A spectre is haunting the international society of nation states--the spectre of militant minorities. Statesmen of virtually every color and political persuasion are forming a Holy Alliance to hunt down and/or, at the same time, accuse each other of stirring up minorities' grievances in order to subvert an established order. Hardly a day passes without some piece of news in the press about violent conflict originating from minority groups: Philippine Muslims attacking a police station; French Bretons blowing up a radio transmitter in Brittany; Corsican nationalists exploding a bomb in the office building housing some French governmental agency; a 20,000-people-strong Amerindian tribe (the Ojibwa-Gree) asking, in 1977, full independence for their territory (half of the province of Ontario) for the year 2000 plus reparations for illegally exploited minerals--and since this request most likely will not only be refused but also not be taken very seriously by the authorities, we can expect at least some acts of so-called terrorism in that part of Canada. "Terrorism" also marked the beginning of a new phase in the struggle for independence or at least "autonomy" on the part of the French-Canadians, culminating with the separatists' landslide victory in 1974. Not too long ago, we witnessed the near-disintegration of the state of Nigeria because of the separatist rebellion of the Biafrans.¹ Currently, the state of Ethiopia seems to be mortally wounded because of the successes of the Eritrean independence movement; Soviet and Cuban military intervention in this area would be unthinkable if it were not for minorities' claims on this state. The widening cracks in the hitherto solid walls of the time-honored state of Great Britain point to the fact that nationalist separatism is everything else but a peripheral phenomenon of the international system. Northern Ireland, the conflict between the Catholic minority and the Protestant majority, has been the scene of a bloody civil war for over ten years with hardly any prospect of a peaceful solution in sight.

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The list of states with distinct ethnic, religious or racial minorities is long; in fact, it is, for practical purposes, almost as long as the list of sovereign states recognized as such, e.g. by membership in the United Nations. Certainly, not all states have, at this point, significant minority problems--but the number of those who do is rapidly growing and has started to include, surprisingly, states such as France and Spain (the two oldest modern states!), Norway, Italy and Austria. Political scientists have investigated this area only very recently and rather marginally. Sociologists and social psychologists have done research before them--but mainly with an eye on race and racial tensions (in the U.S.). Reviewing the literature, we discover a considerable body of scholarship from the 1920s and 1930s on the part of international lawyers, concerned with the legal protection of national minorities during the time of the League of Nations, i.e. after the emergence of a score of new states following World War I, particularly in Eastern and South Eastern Europe. But, considering the undeniable empirical evidence of the growth of ethnic/religious/racial minority consciousness everywhere, accompanied by manifest acts of violence ("terrorism") aiming at the creation of an audience for minority grievances, it is rather surprising that Peace Research has so far almost completely ignored the problem. Yet, few problems--if any--have greater relevance to a discipline created by scholars concerned with research into the causes and origins of violence in contemporary societies. The concept of "structural violence," no doubt fertile for the purpose of sharpening our awareness of latent conflicts below the level of international war (by now almost extinct as a topic of Peace Research) has, unfortunately, made us perceptually blind for the spreading conflicts of manifest violence everywhere. And such acts of manifest violence tend to originate in nine out of ten cases from minority problems within modern state structures. Some of them--most prominently obviously in the case of the Palestinians--carry the potential of open international warfare, if not of a Third World War.

2. Problems of definition and approach

What, then, are the minorities we are talking about? Is it, first of all, possible to subsume such apparently diverse phenomena as South-Tirolese peasants and American Indians, Philippine Muslims and Canadian Eskimos, Sardinians and the Chinese in Malaysia all under one category? This seems too easy, and an analytical category stretched so far tends to lose its heuristic value. Bad or poor simplifications, facile reduction

to handy formulas are, at best, irrelevant for any political praxis that might be hoped for on the part of the analyst; at worst, they lead to false solutions of a given problem and thus make things worse rather than better. Thus, we have to differentiate. But the call for "differentiation" has been traditionally one of the most subtle and effective means to block consequential but correct insights; it can be a "trick" to deprive basically correct findings of a general character of their political-practical consequences. Differentiation is not the more difficult but, rather, the easier part of scholarship, i.e. of that human activity which has to discover truth or evidence through systematic (as opposed to casual) work.² Scientific truth-finding rises from the general, i.e. the empirical to the concrete, i.e. to conceptualization and theory and, only as the second step returns to differentiations or, rather, to factual substantiations. What is attempted here is nothing but the first step of scientific inquiry: the preparation of the grounds for future discussion (and differentiation) of a problem hitherto largely ignored or neglected. In other words, it is an attempt to develop the general framework aiming at a preliminary theory within which such a discussion, both of the phenomenon as such as well as of in-depth case studies, might or should take place.

By limiting the topic to national, ethnic, religious and racial minorities--already, as we shall see, rather imprecise and very diverse categories--we exclude many other forms of minority groups. For example, a recent publication about minorities in the Federal Republic of Germany included, among others, prison inmates and ex-convicts, homosexuals, foreign (guest) workers, homeless paupers and the members of the extraparliamentary opposition.³ In a broader context such minorities could and should be dealt with also, particularly since some of them have become protagonists of manifest political violence. But in order not to complicate this rather rudimentary first inquiry, they will have to be excluded.

3. The nation state as the framework of reference

The minorities which are at the center of this treatise define themselves within a more specific frame of reference, i.e. the territorial nation state which stands here, logically, for the "majority." In order to talk about minorities it is, therefore, necessary to clarify very briefly and synthetically what this territorial nation state is all about. For this purpose it is necessary to go back into history, which constitutes an extremely rich laboratory for the social scientist. What we learn in this respect from history is the following:

1. The territorial organization of society is, both against the background of about 1000 years of European feudalism as well as against the background of African or Amerindian tribal societies a modern phenomenon, distinct from previous forms of political organization however sophisticated or "advanced" they might have been.⁴
2. Territorial state organization is intrinsically related to the emergence of the capitalist mode of production and to the rise of the European bourgeoisie, as the classical sociologists and historians of the late 19th and early 20th century were the first ones to point out. The modern state has all the characteristics of a purposeful, rational institution designed to assist in the most effective development of all productive forces. It is the legal framework, the institutional corollary to capitalism.⁵
3. As far as the historical process itself is concerned, this meant that the modern state was the result of an alliance between the centralizing monarchy and the urban bourgeoisie against the various feudal, landed aristocracies. Besides being or becoming the protector and active promoter of economic ("mercantile") interests abroad, i.e. besides being a state of conquest and aggregate power, the modern state became also the great homogenizer within its territorial boundaries, acquired and defended by military force: court languages became national languages, court or dynastic religions became national religions, court cultures and royal administrations became national cultures and central administrations for the whole territory. The very term "state" has its 13th century origin in the household of the monarch and was extended to define the territorial and social exclusiveness of this new form of political organization only during the 17th and 18th centuries.
4. All of the modern territorial national states, emerging during the process of political disintegration of feudalism, had their origins in the initially limited tribal-territorial dominance of a monarch which was then extended to organize a larger whole for the sake of viability and survival in the world of mercantilist competition. In other words: in one form or another this modern state is the result of conquest and submission under one central power and one cultural formation at the expense of others. To name only a few and in no chronological order or order of significance: Piedmont - Italy; Anjou - France; the English monarchy - Scotland, Wales and Ireland; Prussia - Germany; Castilia - Spain; etc.⁷

5. It lies within the logic of this process, i.e. within the process of creating culturally, administratively and thus nationally homogeneous units, capable of surviving in a world of increasing power-politics and mercantile competitiveness to suppress all those minorities who refused to renounce their pre-state ideological-cultural identity whenever assimilation failed or proceeded too slowly. This socio-political strategy was, by and large, successful, even if sometimes only at the expense of outright physical extermination. Dozens of religious and ethnic minorities have been completely wiped out and can be found only in history books--the Valdensians, the Albigensians or the Huguenots of France, the Jews in Spain and Portugal, the Saracens of Sicily and Southern Italy, to name only a few; others survive only in the form of names on our maps like Saxonians and Thuringians in Germany.

This then is the framework, the starting point or point of reference of the minority problem: the modern state as the great "simplifier," the great "synthesizer," the "melting pot" within which ethnic-religious-cultural diversity was to be transformed into a historically new synthesis: the Nation, created by the state--and not vice versa. It is, in fact, of crucial importance to underline this fact, the historically false reversal of which (the state as the alleged culmination of national consciousness and existence) has given rise to so much ideological confusion and aberration, most notable in the form of modern nationalism. But even if we must recognize clearly the overwhelming success of the policy of national-cultural homogenization by means and in support of the state, it was by far not complete. For one thing it should be kept in mind that this process comprises a relatively short historical period, rarely more than three hundred years, or about six generations, and much shorter still for quite a few of the core nation states. One particularly dramatic example of the incompleteness if not total failure to integrate a variety of nationalities into a new state-nation is the case of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy and empire. In many respects, a careful and more detailed discussion of the disintegration of this unsuccessful state could provide us with useful keys for a better understanding of the minority problem. Not only did it help bring about the First World War, but it also gave rise to the politically most explosive and far-reaching slogans of national self-determination with all its conflict-generating consequences for a new nationstate order in Central and South East Europe after that war. As far as the resurgence of minority consciousness is concerned,

what we witness today can be traced back, partly, to the unfinished discussion, the unsolved problems of the nationality question as it was then raised more or less for the first time. Or rather, the "answers" given then, the solutions conceived by statesmen and diplomats in Versailles, turned out to be largely superficial, deceptive and illusive, i.e. that solution which consisted in allowing each nationality to organize itself as a nation state.

4. The class content of the modern state

In order to clarify further preliminaries, one more, and by no means secondary, aspect of modern statehood has to be introduced which begins to reveal itself concomitantly with the completion of national homogenization and/or its shortcomings. This modern state is, in terms of its social content and according to the interests for whom or by which it was created and took its concrete shape, a class state. But it is a class state not in the crude sense of class domination pure and simple. Rather, the modern state tries to make socio-economic differences, i.e. inequalities, disappear by means of granting legal equalities and offering itself--and membership to the nation--as the primary frame of reference and political socialization. To be a German, Englishman or Italian has been--to repeat: rather successfully--offered as a primary level of social identification to replace or at least, to reduce as much as possible, identification with one's class as well as with one's ethnic or religious, etc. group. The categories "class," "class conflict," let alone the category "class struggle," have, in recent years, been largely eliminated from the respectable scientific language and from the language of consensus politics. One of the reasons for this derives from the fact that "class" had become the simplified slogan of political dogmatists, last but not least intellectual ones, who laid it thus open to the attack of those who had a vested interest in eliminating class and class consciousness as a primary variable of social orientation because it would constitute a political threat to their privileges and thus to class society itself. But the successful operation of exorcising the concept of class from respectable social science terminology and from the perceptual apparatus with which we interpret the world or society around us, does not mean that social stratification and inequalities, in short, that class society itself has been eliminated as well. To insist on the class structure as the content and *raison d'etre* of the modern state should not be confused with a simplified reduction of the complexity of our social reality to a bipolar scheme like

"bourgeoisie" vs. "proletariat." On the contrary, the category of class illuminates the multi-dimensionality of manifolded dependencies and subordinations in the context of social reproduction--without, at the same time, losing sight of a set of basic criteria, the most central of which are those of the control or non-control, property or non-property, command over or dependency on the means of production. The rich complexity and the analytical fertility of the concept of class used in this way to illuminate, among others, group specific privileges in hierarchically organized societies will prove itself as the explanatory key to the minority problem as well. Thus, it is class domination--mediated by territorial state organization--which can under specific historical conditions appear in the form of foreign domination or, reduced to another concept to be developed further on, in the form of internal colonization.

5. Some case studies

A few examples to illustrate this follow.⁸

5.1. Italy/Sardinia

Italy was unified into a nation state by means of a violent process of repression of the South by the North, i.e. by the northern Italian bourgeoisie in alliance with the military and administrative apparatus of the Piedmont monarchy. The resistance of the Southern peasantry, the "brigantismo," derogatorily labeled banditry, through which this class tried to fight back and to maintain its own cultural and sub-political identity, lasted until very recently. It is only the present younger generation of Southern Italy which, by means of a unitary school system, the penetration of television even into the most remote areas, and by emigration has become "italianized"--even though there are at least some sensitive observers who claim that Southern Italy is still an internal colony and that cultural assimilation is only skin deep (and certainly within the northern half of Italy the prejudice is still widespread that Africa begins south of Rome and that southerners are not to be trusted and are different, i.e. inferior). But there is at least one exception to the success story of cultural homogenization: Sardinia. Favored by its position as an island and by the general disinterest of the central government in this very poor region, a Sardinian identity has survived over time and has resisted italianization rather successfully. It is now becoming a political force and factor of considerable potential significance.

When in 1970 the well known Italian publisher Giangiacomo Feltrinelli was found dead near Milan (the causes for his mysterious death have never been established beyond reasonable doubt) it turned out that he had been involved in an operation to mobilize so-called Sardinian "bandits," i.e. Sardinian nationalists and separatists with the goal of proclaiming an independent Sardinian Socialist Republic; allegedly, there was some outside support as well (from Cuba) in the form of a propaganda campaign by means of radio broadcasts. The sentiment of a Sardinian autonomy can be traced to the 19th century; but what was then largely a movement on the part of an enlightened bourgeoisie protesting against its discrimination and exploitation on the part of Piedmont and later the central government in Rome became, during World War I, a mass-based proletarian movement of peasants and shepherds, articulated by intellectuals with strong socialist leanings. Antonio Gramsci, a Sardinian himself, became politicized exactly in this environment and never shed the strong emotional roots he had as a revolutionary in this island. But he, as well as the more explicit protagonists of Sardinian autonomy realized very clearly that Sardinian inferiority and exploitation could be altered and reversed only in the broader context of radical changes on the Italian continent. The battle cry of those years--"continentals into the sea!"--was always understood as a tactical first step towards a socialist and autonomous Sardinia; in fact, autonomy and socialism were seen as synonymous.⁹ After the long interlude of fascism and the first decade of postwar reconstruction which brought first hope and soon thereafter disillusionment for Sardinian development (together with Sicily and the Italian South, Sardinia has the highest regional emigration rate), the separatist movement grew again in strength and ideological cohesion. The history of the Italo-Sardinian relationship began to be seen increasingly in terms of colonization. From the period of Italian unification onward ("We have always been the objects of history, never its protagonists. We entered Italian history only because Cavour did not have time or the opportunity to exchange us for something else."), Sardinia was nothing but an appendix to the continental economy; even today the development programs mean, in real terms, just that: e.g. the highly polluting petro-chemical industry builds its plants there with the promise of creating jobs which then turn out to be minimal because of modern labor-saving devices. In addition, the wellknown corruption of the political class in Rome carries a lot of weight in favor of dissociation from the "mother country." But, what seems to be most indicative and decisive is the nexus between cultural alienation and class society spelled out by the

Sardinian separatists: "Italian is the language of the ruling class ('padrone')," "the cultural assimilation of the Sardinians to the colonial power has forced them to renounce their own identity," or, most explicitly "the struggle for the /Sardinian% language is a class struggle." It is interesting to note in this context that Sardinic is largely (or was until most recently) a spoken language only¹⁰ and that it has not been permitted in schools or universities-- anybody using it in such public functions as teaching risks losing his job. For a few years, after the seemingly rather bizarre episode of 1970, there were no more significant cases of manifest violence to express the grievances of this colonized island minority in such a way that the authorities and the public at large would take note of it--until most recently, in the context of the kidnapping of DC-president Aldo Moro (March-May, 1978) it turned out that strong ties exist between the Red Brigades and Sardinian "bandits" turned terrorists, with the common goal of destroying the capitalist state of Italy. According to police reports, terrorist attacks by Sardinian militants against Italian state institutions (usually police or carabinieri posts) have multiplied "a hundredfold" from 1977 to 1978. An international involvement in assisting Sardinian revolutionary autonomism, this time beyond the modest one of Cuba of some years ago cannot be anymore excluded and seems, in fact, a rather plausible hypothesis within the context of a declared big-power hostility against the Communist Party's "Historical Compromise." In any case, we can expect a new and growing wave of political terrorism--and its corollary: repression--originating here from a struggle against internal colonization which has deep historical roots.

5.2.1. France/Corsica

More dramatic or more advanced in terms of conflict maturation is the case of the neighboring island of Corsica. The annual list of "terrorist acts" for which Corsican separatists declare themselves responsible, has grown considerably over the last few years. Directed against government buildings, radio stations, real estate agencies and well-to-do French immigrants, there were 9 in 1971, 18 in 1972, 42 in 1973, 110 in 1974, 226 in 1975 and 298 in 1976; alone on the night of the famous Fourth of July, 1977, there were 20 bomb explosions and 5 assassination attempts. What is this all about? The history of Corsica, hardly known to the outsider, gives us a few, initial clues: all during the 18th century rebellious against its Genoese rulers, Corsica became, in 1755 after a revolutionary upheaval under Pasquale Paoli, the first modern republic with a liberal constitution (division of powers) that had no equivalent at

that time. Genoa, unable to cope with this militarily, sold the island in 1764 to France which conquered and destroyed the republic in a bloody 5-year war, ending in 1769--the year Napoleon was born (who recalls in his memoirs the cruel repression of liberty as one of his most formative experiences as a young man). From then on, Corsica remained a part of France, sharing with it periods of hope (during the Revolution) and reaction, but becoming, similar to Sardinia, a neglected appendage to the French economy during the period of capitalist growth. The 20th century saw a steady decline in population--from 32,000 in 1900 to about 320,000 presently--due to economically motivated emigration (800,000 Corsicans are said to live in France and the rest of the world); between 1957 and 1973 alone about 40,000 Corsicans have left their homeland. The reaction and violent resistance against this process started in the late 1950s when the French government embarked upon a large-scale program for the resettlement of the "pieds noirs," expelled from Algeria and equipped with generous governmental subsidies to create for them a new economic base in Corsica. Of the 200,000 inhabitants, only less than 120,000 are native, genuine Corsicans and their number is steadily declining, particularly among the younger generation, due to emigration. At the same time, the economic power positions became increasingly monopolized by "pieds noirs" and continental French immigrants: 6% of all agricultural enterprises cultivate 41% of the arable land, i.e. big latifundia in the hands of capitalist "foreign" farmers, while 50% of the farms cultivate 6% of the land, i.e. the Corsican peasant is a small holder. Of 30,000 ha vineyards--and wine is one of the main sources of income--only 5,000 are in Corsican hands (we find similar proportions only in Latin America). Another lucrative source of income, tourism and the tourism-related building industry, is firmly controlled by continental capital interests. 20% of the Corsican population of working age is unemployed, the per capita income in Corsica lies 15% below the French level while prices (partly due to transport costs of their dependent-integrated economy) are on the average 10% higher than in France. This then is the general background to Corsican nationalist revival and rebellious violence. "If we were blacks like in Martinique, there would not be problems," according to one of the spokesmen of the resistance movement. "Even Marchais is for self determination of Martinique. To us Corsicans he concedes, and even this only lately, the right to autonomy after labeling us fascists until not long ago." Corsica, having been left behind and/or forced into the well-known process of colonial underdevelopment during the capitalist-industrial revolution consequently did not and could not develop an indus

trial proletariat or working class which, as an organized and articulate social formation, would have been able to make its claims and fight for socio-economic changes. Instead, where all indigenous social classes have been reduced to an admittedly differentiated social formation of a colonized national minority within a state framework controlled by another nationality, the struggle for a larger and more equal share becomes almost unavoidably a nationalist-separatist struggle, when ethnic minority consciousness takes the role of social or class consciousness. The protagonists of Corsican separatism at least see their situation very much in terms of the world-wide struggle for national self-determination. Until recently, the more moderate political organization, the *Union du Peuple Corse* (UPC), put its hope in a left-wing government in France which might have given the island a certain degree of autonomy; with this hope indefinitely postponed, the political enemy will no longer be the French government but the French state.

5.2.2.

France/Brittany

But Corsica is, as far as France is concerned, far from being unique--in fact, probably due to her long centralistic tradition in politics and administration, as well as because of the centuries' old concentration of culture in Paris, the royal court first and in the republican capital later, the French state seems to be particularly prone to the revival of ethnic minorities' "revenge." In the late 1960s a series of bombing attacks on objects which represent the central government in the region (an office of the ministry of agriculture, a radio tower) brought Brittany into the news. The government reacted with a vigorous campaign of repression, arrested numerous suspects and forced the FLB (*Front de liberation de la Bretagne*) which was held responsible for this "terrorism," into illegality. Breton nationalism is, as we now learn by means of the rude language of violence, not something new and certainly not without its own historical as well as socio-economic justification. For about a thousand years the Celts, after fleeing England from Anglo-Saxon conquest, held out in their Little Brittany against the French monarchy. Only in 1491 did Charles VIII succeed through dynastic marriage in incorporating Brittany as a duchy into the French kingdom but only at the price of granting a large variety of autonomy rights and privileges to the region. This led to continuous friction and repeated armed conflicts. In 1975, the movement to Celtic autonomy and self-determination, Kendalc'h, remembered in one of its publications the threehundredth anniversary of the rebellion of Nantes in 1675, which was suffocated in blood only after a year's fighting.¹¹ Not

until the early 19th century did the armed resistance against the central government disappear: organized cultural and political resistance which kept the idea of a Breton identity, separate from French culture and history, still remained alive. Before World War II the more radical elements of Breton nationalism were organized in the *Parti Nationaliste Breton* (PNB) which discredited itself and, for a long time its own movement as well, by partial collaboration with the Nazi occupation. Now that this period has been largely forgotten, the movement raises its head again but, most significantly, with a clarified and politically sophisticated understanding of the problem. The fact that Brittany--similarly to the case of Corsica--has not participated equally in the post-war reconstruction boom is the background to the current revival and unrest. Fishermen, small peasants, the workers in the shipbuilding industry discover through their economic marginalization their ethnic identity. Or, vice versa, their hitherto more latent than conscious ethnic and cultural diversity, their history as a history of resistance to and submission by the French government in Paris makes them see and understand themselves and their problems in a new light. Again, the colonization syndrome emerges: tourism, which during the summer season nearly doubles the population of Brittany, is sometimes referred to as a version of such colonization--"tourist colonization"--and is compared to American tourism in the Indian reservations. The recently (1975) formed *Front Socialiste Autogestionnaire Breton*, an alliance which comprises most of the nationalist groups, advocates not a simple separation from France but the "struggle against the political domination of Brittany by capitalism and the French state." The various newsletters and publications of the Breton movement are full of references to other emancipatory movements elsewhere, be it Jurassiens, the Basques, Corsicans or Quebecois. And as in the case of the Corsican movement, what is today an anti-government mobilization can easily radicalize itself into an anti-French state resistance which it is in part today. (There is at least one serious case study which argues the viability of an independent Brittany, written by an Austrian economist residing in Puerto Rico who studied the region after having answered the same question in the affirmative for Wales.)¹²

What needs to be emphasized here is the learning process which the Breton movement has gone through and which we see repeated as an almost regular pattern in other cases as well: from bourgeois-nationalism to the discovery of the socioeconomic content of modern state formation and, consequently,

to a radical questioning of the capitalist mode of production as being the root cause of regional inequalities and underdevelopment, of the colonial structure prevailing in the metropolitan periphery relationship not only internationally but within the capitalist nation-state formation as well.

5.2.3. France/Alsace

Different in its origins and cultural background but with similar results of a radical--nor yet explicitly socialist-politicization is the case of Alsace: after a particularly painful history of being the pawn in national power politics between Germany and France (annexed by France in 1648, conquered and re-annexed by Germany in 1871, returned to France in 1918, again German from 1940 to 1944), the Alsatians don't question their membership in the French state community. But what some of them, particularly among the younger generation, do question is the logic of capitalism which has made this particularly rich region an easy prey for multinational companies with all its social and ecological consequences. It all started in 1974 in Marckolsheim when hundreds of peasants with their tractors, supported and skillfully organized by a large network of mainly young ecologists, occupied the construction site of a new chemical plant (of German capital) which threatened to ruin the agricultural production of the area because of its highly poisonous fall-out. This incident (the action was eventually successful; the plant was not built) gave rise to a most dramatic radicalization of a generally rather conservative peasantry and became the starting point of a political revival of Alsatian cultural identity. In particular, young folksingers rose to the occasion, and opted out of the seductive French cultural hegemony in favor of their native, German-Alsatian historical roots, and, discovering a long forgotten tradition of resistance to the central government and to the ruling classes in general (the Peasant Wars of 1525 had its 450th anniversary with documentary and other historical publications appropriately appearing in that same year) they were able to articulate a widely spread feeling of uneasiness and resentment against industrial capitalism and the sell-out of Alsace to foreign interests. Because of favorable tax laws and lenient security regulations, West German, Swiss, American, English and other companies find this region particularly attractive--at the expense of the indigenous (largely peasant) population which suffers from rapidly rising real estate prices and sees its landscape quickly destroyed; almost half of Alsace's industrialization over the last two decades has been the work of foreign and so-called

multinational firms.¹³ The lower wage rate has induced many Alsatian workers (daily about 28,000) to cross the borders to West Germany and Switzerland where they find better pay while the jobs created by the new industrial boom are being partly filled with "guest workers" from Southern Europe. With the exception of "passive resistance" practiced against at least one pollution-producing industrial plant, Alsace has not yet witnessed any acts of "terrorism;" the Alsace protest movement is also still a long way from having created a significant socialist political consciousness (the left-wing parties are weaker here than in other French regions). It has, however, prepared the ground for such consciousness through the peculiar and unique rediscovery of a popular minority culture underneath the perverted surface of its folkloristic features which now tends to question and threaten the dominant culture (French in form, capitalist consumer-oriented in substance). These first symptoms of an Alsatian "cultural revolution" might very well point towards the formation of another "anti-colonialist" movement within one of the oldest and seemingly most cohesive European nation states.¹⁴

5.3. Spain

That age as such does not by itself make up for structural defects, i.e. that time, or rather force does not heal, we find confirmed when looking at Spain, by historical comparison the first modern state (and, not accidentally, the protagonist of European capitalist expansion) :¹⁵ here it is particularly the case of Basque people which has made and keeps making international headlines because of its obstinate resistance against the central government both under Franco and after. At first sight this seems to be a case where the roles have been reversed: because of an earlier and faster industrialization process in this region, dating back to the 19th century and strengthening their sense of pride and uniqueness, the Basque people enjoy the highest per capita income in all of Spain (except for Madrid). It seems, therefore, as if the appeal that Basque nationalism has (and the corollary resentment of the central government) is based on privileges and the fight to keep them, as if the Basques objected to being taxed and to finance the less privileged, less developed regions of the country. A closer look, however, reveals a quite different picture: while 'the upper classes, economically prosperous exactly because of the industrialization, were strongly tied to and identified with Madrid, Basque nationalism, the revival and cultivation of a Basque identity different from the Spanish, was from its inception an expression of a specified form of political, of

class consciousness on the part of workers and small peasants. They were--together with the Catalonians--the strongest bulwark of the Spanish Republic and of resistance against Francofascism. Deep-rooted traditions of local autonomy and selfdetermination survived even under Franco: their language, officially forbidden, became the vehicle of anti-fascist sentiments and attitudes. In 1970, 50% of the population could still either speak or read it even though it had not been taught in schools or spoken publicly for thirty years. And, to repeat, it was Spain which had embarked on a systematic process of ideological (religious) and cultural homogenization long before any of the later modern territorial states, beginning with the 16th century Inquisition and the forced emigration of its Jewish population. In addition, not only the Basques are fighting today for more autonomy and some even for full independence from Spain (by means which range from the legal-political to "terrorist violence"), but by now there are similar movements in Catalonia, in Andalusia, Valencia as well as in the Balearic Islands; recently the press reported the first bomb explosions by a national liberation movement on the Canaries, and resentment is growing even in the heartland of this centralized state, the Castilian provinces, against the overpowering and exploitation by the spreading capital, Madrid. It is, among other factors, the difference in social composition that accounts for the determination--and, consequently, also for the means employed, i.e. peaceful-cultural vs. violent--with which an ethnic minority makes its claims, and, most of all, which claims are being made: the working class and peasant background of Basque nationalism give it its particularly socio-revolutionary character, as compared with the Catalanian version, for example, where a traditionalist and proud bourgeoisie seems to be satisfied--at least at this point--in reconquering its own literature, language, etc., claims which have been met to some degree by the post-Franco regime.

6. Some preliminary conclusions and applications

This necessarily brief and schematic summary of some of the more virulent cases of minority revival in Western Europe allows us to return to the more general analysis as indicated with the theoretical framework from which we started. To repeat: it is the modern territorial nation state with its social strategy to homogenize and discipline its population which constitutes the starting point. But, we added, this modern state is in terms of its structure and social stratification the state of class society which is, in turn, based on

the capitalist mode of production. Pre-capitalist societies, even though certainly more or less rigidly stratified and hierarchically organized as well, were not class societies in the modern sense of the term which allows, among other things, a certain degree of inter-class mobility, different from one country to another. The class character of the modern state manifests or reifies itself only rarely, if ever, in its most abstract, "ideal type" form, i.e. as the antagonism between the "exploiters" and the "exploited" or between "bourgeoisie" and "proletariat." Rather, it can and does appear also in the form of regional differentiation and privileges, as uneven and unequal development, not only, as we are generally aware of through the detailed analysis of imperialism, in the context of the international system but within national boundaries as well: the concentration of capital, of the productive forces in areas where profits (for whatever reasons) are high, with the concomitant neglect and underdevelopment, the draining of resources from other areas-- these are two sides of the law of capitalist production. It is in this process, a dynamic and multifaceted process which aims by its own logic at the transformation of ethnic, religious, etc. pluralism into a rational class society of producers and consumers that cultural, regional, racial differences in certain cases and under certain conditions are not overcome but, on the contrary, aggravated. Where pre-modern ethnic cohesion and identity survived the culturally nivellizing impact of the capitalist revolution, regional inequalities in economic development and social differences between the "privileged" and the "underprivileged" tend to be perceived and eventually articulated as national, religious or racial discrimination. As Eric Williams in his study of *"Capitalism and Slavery"* was one of the first to point out: it is not racism that produced slavery but slavery has created racism (from above); black consciousness among the American blacks since the late 1960s is nothing but the positive reversal of this historical and social syndrome, a particular form of rudimentary class consciousness. Among its manifestations we find both, black separatism as well as explicitly anti-capitalist orientations, tendentially capable of seeing the fate of the American working class as well as to those who are economically exploited and socially discriminated by American imperialism-capitalism abroad. Similarly, the violence that has torn apart whole cities in Northern Ireland and has mobilized hatred to a degree that a peaceful reconciliation seems to be inconceivable, does not originate from religious differences between Catholics and Protestants as such who, after all, live harmoniously together elsewhere. Certainly,

there are many layers to be dissected in this particularly vicious and multifaceted civil war. But, when everything is said and analyzed in terms of group psychology, perceptual distortions, attitudinal differences between the "two cultures," etc.,¹⁶ the single most powerful factor that emerges as the stumbling block to any well-intentioned attempt at conflict resolution by constitutional, political or educational means, is the profound socio-economic cleavage that exists between the two religious groups. It existed since the British conquest and has led to centuries of rebellion and bloody repression in the whole of Ireland and was, consequently, not to be solved by the externally imposed separation of the small Northern part with its Protestant majority who defended and still defends its privileges. It does so not consciously and explicitly in class terms--as no privileged class ever does--but the Protestants' privileged class position is the dominant, the independent variable to which the rest of the conflict dimensions are tied in a no doubt complex and often contradictory way: not all Protestants are well-to-do entrepreneurs or belong to the upper middle class and not all of the working class is Catholic. In fact, the conflict between Catholic and Protestant workers is an intrinsic part of the picture--to be Protestant gives that (small) segment of the lower and working class the illusion of being better, the hope to rise above its present status by associating with the powerful bloc of the majority-dominant stratum. It is, indeed, the very strength of any empirical class analysis of social conflicts to account for exactly such apparent contradictions, just as ethnic conflicts (in the broadest meaning of the term) are at the same time the expression and the very opposite, the "perversion" so to speak of class conflict. Ethnic/religious/racial identification is, by definition, false consciousness and yet the very vehicle by means of which consciousness can, under the given specific conditions, be achieved.

7. A Marxist heritage

Otto Bauer, the austro-marxist, called, back in 1907, "national hatred . . . transformed class hatred." In fact, what needs to be rediscovered is the marxist debate of more than sixty or eighty years ago--a debate that shows not only an acute awareness and sensitivity (which might not be so surprising if one remembers the profound crises infesting the preWorld War I regimes exactly from that source, the AustroHungarian Empire being the most prominent but certainly not the only example) but also an analytical level rarely reached again

at later times. It involved, besides the austro-marxists, all the theoreticians of the international socialist movement, be it Lenin or Luxemburg, Stalin or Kautsky. Obviously, their main and immediate concern was the relationship between the organized European industrial working classes and bourgeois nationalism, i.e. that nationalism which aimed at national independence (of Poland from Czarist Russia, of Hungary or of the Czechs and Slovaks from the Austrian monarchy, etc.) rather than at a socialist transformation of international society. But, in spite of all the controversies over this difficult issue, it was agreed that there existed a distinct connection between the two forms of oppression: national oppression within so-called multinational empires had to be understood basically as one of the many forms or expressions of (capitalist) class society. Thus, in the case of Ireland, Lenin could write in 1916: "To believe that the social revolution is conceivable without the rebellion of smaller nations in the colonies and in Europe without revolutionary upheavals of a part of the small bourgeoisie with all its prejudices, without the movement of retarded proletarian and semi-proletarian masses against the yoke of the landowners and of the church, against the monarchistic and national oppression, etc., to believe that means to renounce the social revolution . . . He who expects a 'pure' social revolution will never see it. He is a revolutionary only in words and does not understand the real revolution." He would find himself with that evaluation in loyal company with Karl Marx who also maintained in his many pronouncements on the Irish question during the late 1860s and early 1870s that the national independence of Ireland is the precondition for the emancipation of both the Irish as well as the British working classes. National domination and nationalist rebellion against majority nationalism were seen then--as they are now--as a concealed class relationship or as a particular expression of class society. In fact, as the history of the working class movements not only in Europe but beyond as well has shown: working class consciousness in its "pure" political form tends to be the exception rather than the rule of (political) consciousness formation; instead, such class consciousness tends to need a vehicle, an "impure," reification corresponding to empirical, immediate, direct experiences. Just as the Irish working class became class conscious first as Irish and only then (partly) as working class, so other politically and socially underprivileged groups in the most diverse parts of the world became aware of their oppression by means of the experience of being a discriminated (racial, religious, ethnic, etc.) group. Or rather: it was and is the not so unusual

coincidence of class oppression and group discrimination which allows for the raising of collective consciousness or politicization. Group identification precedes here political consciousness or, more correctly, it is the form in which such political experiences can and are being made. What appears as ethnic, religious, etc. discrimination tends to be, in essence, social discrimination, the result of class stratification.

One of the few outstanding contributions to the problem of the class basis of ethnic discrimination after the austromarxists comes from a brilliant Jewish intellectual and fighter in the anti-fascist resistance in Belgium, Abraham Leon, himself at the age of 26 a victim (at Auschwitz) of this probably most barbarous anti-minority policy known in history. In his unfinished essay on "The Jewish Question and Capitalism" (1942), he employs the concept of an "ethnic class" in order to explain the difference between pre-capitalist persecution of the Jewish people and modern anti-Semitism which is a direct by-product of class stratification during the period of the crisis of capitalism in decline, giving rise to fascism as a "solution." Anti-Semitism, created and manipulated from "above," does correspond to a concrete experience of fear of competition on the part of the lower middle classes, threatened in their economic as well as their ideological position and looking for a negative dissociative identity. What the anti-Catholic resentment is for the Irish Protestant worker is anti-Semitism for the middle classes, the "aristocracism of the man on the street," as Thomas Mann has called it.

8. Towards new experiences of social inequalities

The emphasis is then on immediate experience: the "classical" socialist movement of pre-World War 1 worked with the hypothesis that social injustice, the exploitation of one class by another or by others, would be self-evident to the members of the oppressed class. The industrial workers in particular, making collectively their daily experiences of being not only poorer than the rest of society but also deprived of their most elementary rights and need-fulfillments, would be propelled towards class consciousness by the iron logic of this very situation. The revolutionary party would have the function of an organizer, of a catalyst, reducing the time span of consciousness formation and of supplying the theory necessary to understand the experiences made in daily life with the scope of forming collective action towards specific goals, i.e. towards a radical change of the root causes of the empirical misery rather than towards superficial, short-range remedies. The concern here is not,

however, with these larger questions. Only this much should be stated in general terms: welfare capitalism in general, nationalism during a certain period (the interwar years in W. Europe with fascism and nazism as their extreme expressions) in particular, and the present fixation on the state as a "neutral" arbiter with increasing interventionist capacities to reduce and channel social conflicts--all those sociopolitical strategies have contributed to the fact that social class in its "pure" form becomes less and less the framework or the sphere for experiencing inequalities. In the so-called advanced capitalist societies it is, rather, issues like urban renewal (the expulsion of the working population from the urban centers), like pollution, like the construction of atomic reactors--and like the relative ethno-cultural discrimination of minorities, which reopen the critique of capitalism both as a mode of production not primarily "designed" to fulfill human needs (following the logic of profitability instead) and as a society based on and reproducing social inequalities, i.e. an classes. It is, therefore, not accidental that in all the cases briefly presented previously we find eventually the emergence of anti-capitalist and/or socialist organizations taking the lead in articulating the immediate experiences of the discriminated minorities.

8.1. Belgium

Doubtless this is so far, a tendency rather than a visible process. It is at best very rudimentary for example in the case of the Belgian "language dispute," where the Flemishspeaking population, underrepresented in public administration but with an increasing share in the economy, rebels against the French-speaking Walloons who dominate in public life but represent a decreasing economic sector; both, however, are affected by rising prices and growing unemployment, and are therefore fighting for jobs under the "false" flag of linguistic discrimination.

8.2. Wales

The case of Wales--different in form but similar in structure--represents a socially as yet "underdeveloped" conflict when, according to a report in The New York Times (April 22, 1977) the home-rule party *Plaid Cymru* interprets its revival as "part ,of a worldwide phenomenon, a reaction against the mass society" and advocates a community type of democratic socialism; even though the large majority of the Welsh population seems to be satisfied to be ruled from Westminster, the resentment is

growing (12,000 votes in 1945, 170,000 in 1974), particularly after Parliament killed a limited home rule bill in February 1977: "Some younger and more desperate nationalists have begun to talk of . . . chasing out the part-time English residents who own vacation homes and declaring independence . . . Indeed, there is concern that the nationalists' frustration might lead to violence . . . There has been sporadic violence in the _ past, directed at property, not people. Even now, /there is/ a campaign of sabotage in areas where the Government has been slow to add Welsh to English on the road signs . . . /And/ it has been only a few years since its leaders were blowing up electric-power stations to protest English exploitation of the countryside.

8.3. Scotland

Different again, the case of Scotland: a difference that shows how the issue of intra-capitalist national resentments and revolts cannot be reduced to simplistic denominators ("national minority consciousness = political class consciousness") but which remains an issue that can adequately be understood only within the matrix of capitalistically created relationships and conditions and, consequently, that can be solved only by breaking out of this system. While Ireland had been conquered and Irish nationalism, therefore, remained tied to lower class resistance against the conqueror as an exploiter, Scotland was united with England by the Act of Union (1707), a dynastic agreement which left it with a wide range of cultural and legal autonomy, carefully guarded by the Scottish aristocracy and kept alive by its upper bourgeoisie. Thus the exploiting class remained culturally Scottish or, vice versa, Scottish nationalism was always a ruling class affair. It is, therefore, not by chance that Scottish labor organizations have been in the forefront of British unionism since the 1830s and '40s. On the other hand, it is the recent discovery of the North Sea oil which has reopened an issue, the issue of Scottish identity, that seemed to be reduced to nothing more than folklore and a tourist attraction: it is now a rising or rather, an aspiring middle class which sees in Scottish control over these riches a means to economic and political power over the big English and foreign (largely American) capital enterprises which have turned Scotland into an externally controlled and, therefore, dependent economy, and to get even with the English ruling class as well. This movement has found wide support among the working class population for whom the campaign for Scottish self-determination is a way of reopening the wider issue of

exploitation: foreign first, domestic second. The British Labour Party is genuinely worried about losing out to the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP), while an increasingly strong and articulate minority of Scottish marxists see in the rejuvenation of class politics within the issue of Scottish selfgovernment (and, therefore, in conflict with the Labour Party leadership in London) the only chance of preventing the antiEnglish resentment from becoming a reactionary force by directing it towards the real issues of exploitation and discrimination. As one of them put it: "Cultural integrity, local selfrespect, the redistribution of Highland estates, the survival of the Gaelic language, the control of the side-effects of the exploitation on North Sea oil--all those and many more of the dreams close to the heart of many Scottish nationalists all depend on the hard facts of world political and economic structures. They will never become realities unless the struggle for them is seen in the context of world struggle against the imperialism of international, largely American, capital. This assertion . . . assumes, as any socialist should assume, that Scotland must be free of the U.K., the England-dominated web of power and exploitation."¹ In 1975, the first--apparently childishly conceived--self-styled Scottish national liberation army was uncovered by the police before it could commit any terrorist act; whether it was also the last one remains to be seen.

8.4. Québec

Acts of such terrorism marked the beginning or, rather, the spectacular turning point of another independence movement which has meanwhile gone much further than any other within the metropolitan countries: the *Québec Liberation Front* (FLQ) in Canada. The spectacular kidnapping in 1970 of the Senior British Trade Commissioner in Montreal, James R. Cross, and the part of the FLQ (and the invocation of the War Measures Act in peacetime by Prime Minister Trudeau) focused international attention on a conflict that had been simmering for a long time--as far as the Quebec nationalists are concerned, for 300 years (varying from passive resistance to riots, uprisings and rebellions), i.e. ever since this French colony passed into British hands by a purely military decision in 1763. A well-stated case of Quebec discrimination like the following one by a leading separatist had gone unnoticed until, almost ten years later, "terrorism" threw a brutal light on the situation: "We French-Canadians made up twenty-nine per cent of Canada's population in 1951, but our participation in the economy was limited to five or ten per cent, closer to five than to ten. In Quebec we are eighty-three

per cent of the population, but less than twenty per cent of the economy is in our hands. At the Montreal Stock Exchange (you rarely hear it called *la Bourse de Montréal*) it is said that one per cent of the business is based on French-Canadian capital--in a city containing at least a million FrenchCanadians!," etc.¹⁸ In particular, the relatively late industrialization of Quebec was largely monopolized by the small Anglo-Canadian upper class of the province which had been, until then, predominantly rural and backward by comparison. Thus we find here another case where the national minority issue is intrinsically interwoven with a class conflict which is concretely experienced, at least initially, not as such but, again, as an issue of ethnic discrimination. The overwhelming electoral victory of the *Parti Québécois* in 1976 has by now moved the problem on another level where separation from the Canadian state (with the consequences of its disintegration) cannot be completely excluded anymore. Whether or not that takes place will be decided by the real class interests of the P.Q. which are, as of now, rather ambiguous and contradictory. What holds the movement together so far is a common resentment against foreign domination and exploitation (Anglo-Canadian as well as US) but this negative alliance will and must break up once the real issue of social change in favor of the underprivileged within the French-speaking majority of the province is going to be faced--after the removal of the external signs of cultural and administrative discrimination which is a comparatively easy operation. International strategic considerations and interests (the role of Quebec in US North American defense planning is of no minor importance) will prove to be not the least of all obstacles to a separatist state whose advocates are talking already now at times of "the first socialist republic in North America."

9. Secessions are not the answer

The universal phenomenon of minority resistance to nation state imposed uniformity shows different patterns in those societies which do not have a socialist or marxist tradition to provide a minimal analytical framework for a structural understanding of the root causes--and possible remedies--of ethnic discrimination. As such, the "minority problem" is considerably larger and potentially more serious for the nonAtlantic, i.e. the so-called underdeveloped world. If anything, contrary to the evidence cited so far, the metropolitan countries have infinitely fewer minority problems than most of the countries in the periphery with their extremely short history of externally imposed state organizations. Only about one-tenth

of all sovereign states of today can be called ethnically homogeneous; about forty per cent contain populations composed of more than five significant national groups.¹⁹ Probably the most extreme case is the South Pacific area, where six million people with 1200 different languages (and even more dialects) live under more than twenty administrations and in about half a dozen independent states. But the African situation, where colonial successor states have been superimposed on a myriad of tribal organizations, is certainly not much less dramatic. Here the artificiality of territorial state organization is immediately evident--artificial, however, only from the point of view of the self-determination of the people concerned but consistent within the framework of international capitalist system stabilization which requires states for disciplinary purposes, as a guarantor of "law and order" on the basis of class inequalities. That we have not witnessed, so far, more state-organized violence against ethnic minorities than has actually been the case (Biafra being only the most publicized one) is largely due to the fact that most of these "ethnics" have remained outside their respective national-state cultures. A 1972 UNESCO study indicated that as much as 70 per cent of the world's population had little or no knowledge beyond the village level, i.e. that the state to which they belong remains--or was up till now--an abstraction, outside or above their concrete social experience, with no meaning to them as a framework of political identification and socialization. But with the accelerated process of competitive international integration and capitalist penetration, it does not take much foresight or political prophecy to predict a rising level of both, politicized group consciousness on the part of these *ethnoi* as well as violent conflicts between those national groups who fear for their privileged positions and those who became aware of their role as the underprivileged exploited. And in all these cases the state is bound to be at the very center of these conflicts: as an instrument in the defense of class positions for the one side, and as the expression, the "symbol" of repression and discrimination for the other side. Secessions and/or federalizations can be intermediate but certainly not long-term solutions to such ethnically perceived socio-economic inequalities.

And they can be such temporary, short-term solutions only in those cases where minorities can make historically legitimate territorial claims as in most of the cases indicated so far, as in the Pacific islands, as in Indonesia or, maybe, as in the case of the North American Indians, where we observe a growing

movement towards the rediscovery of an Indian cultural identity -- including some as yet isolated spectacular acts of counterviolence to recuperate earlier territorial rights ("Red Power"). But the situation is quite different in all those cases where the presence of physiologically identifiable minorities in colonial successor states is in itself the legacy of colonialism and of colonial economic policies. In these cases, secession from or local autonomy within a given state is completely inconceivable, if for no other than for purely demographic reasons: Northern Ireland (the single most significant colonial case in Western Europe) is as indivisible as is Malaysia or New Guinea or as the United States, for that matter, where there is not even the slightest correspondence between territorial and ethnic-class borderlines. It is in these cases where the class character of ethnic or racial or religious discrimination tends to emerge faster and with a greater potential of civil war violence, exactly because the deceptive false hope of achieving social equality through national independence does not exist.

10. One some historico-anthropological origins of ethnic differences

Research into the colonial, i.e. capitalist, origins of ethnic minorities particularly within the new Modern States is still in its beginnings--or at least such insights have hardly as yet reached the level of a broader public consciousness.²⁰ When Uganda ruthlessly expelled its East Indian minority (most of them had occupied relatively privileged positions as either entrepreneurs or retailers), the Western reaction was a largely hypocritical outcry against black racism but hardly any attempt was made to see this act as an attempt to redress a daily reminder of Uganda's past as a colony. And, as far as the frontiers of research are concerned, the relationship between social stratification and ethno-racial differentiation has yet to be fully explored and its findings to be incorporated in strategies towards the overcoming of such counter-productive conflicts. There are some indications to support the hypothesis, that, anthropologically speaking, social differentiation produced or at least reinforced and sharpened racial differences--and not vice versa. This point is of extreme importance in order to support, once more, the axiom with which a critical social science stands or falls, i.e. the axiom that complex social phenomena including their psychological expressions and/or appearances (like hatred against minorities) can be, in principle, reduced to the system of social reproduction. If we can establish a relationship between racial differences--the

origin of so many conflicts, prejudices, social diseases, of so much poison and collective perversion--and social structure, a great step forward would be accomplished. Reduced to a very rudimentary summary, we can state it this way:²¹ It seems to be one of the unique characteristics of Homo sapiens that the racial diversity of our species did not lead to the consolidation of different subspecies, as in all other biological families. No temporal and spacial periods of isolation were sufficiently permanent, due to the incomparably greater mobility of the human species, to allow the emergence of such anthropoid subspecies. Intercontinental migrations led to fusions, crossbreeding and intermingling during the Neolithic and, to a certain extent, the Megolithic periods. Furthermore, even apparently diverse populations, such as those which exist in Southeast Asia, Central and South Asia, and in North and East Africa, were, as historical anthropology has indicated, always characterized by a relatively high degree of racial heterogeneity. Even within our immediate past (16th-19th century), new racial mixture zones have emerged in Siberia, the Far East, North and South America, South Africa, Australia and in Oceania. This mixing within the species, again in contrast to other biological families, has not been limited merely to the border and contact zones of diverse populations, but has taken place also, and especially, within their respective centers. This has been the result of migratory movements and conquests, of the conflict and assimilation of differently organized social groups. The resulting ethnic and genetic differences are function of social stratifications, and not vice versa--they tend to stabilize themselves as racial differences only over longer periods of time. In other words, genetic differences mark the borderlines between social and occupational groups and thus lines between social and occupational groups tend to fade away or even disappear with the disappearance of the group divisions themselves. The human races, seemingly distinct and taxonomically identifiable, are thus, upon closer examination, complex and everything but pure formations. They are the historically fluid, transient result of migration movements and their eventual social re-stabilization. On the other hand, however, social distances or differences are intensified and deepened especially because they present themselves--in form and content--as racial differences or distances and are as such empirically perceived. This experience of social distance as ethnic or racial difference tends to add a dimension to social conflicts by sharpening and deepening them to such a degree that it appears to most antagonists as the root cause itself, as the independent variable. The appearance (ethnic

differences) is being taken for, or confused with, the essence (the social distances).

Not being an expert or widely enough read in this particular field of historical social anthropology, I feel free to quote from a relatively recent Norwegian study which tends to confirm, almost as in a laboratory case study, the hypothesis that ethnic and cultural differences are the dependent variable of social conditions, differentiating themselves in this case on the basis of ecological differences.²² The author shows for a particular Norwegian region where a minority of mountain peasants is encountering a growing resentment and suspicion on the part of the majority lowland peasantry, "that the organization of ethnic identities does not depend on cultural diversity *per se*, as generally assumed in anthropology, but rather on the assignment of particular social meanings to a limited set of acts." Those particular mountain peasants had not settled there until the 16th and 17th centuries and it is "therefore reasonable to assume that the whole southern Norwegian farming population, mountaineers and lowlanders alike, has a common cultural source. On the other hand, this population has developed divergent cultural traits, or styles of life, in response to adaptive requirements and opportunities provided by variations in ecological conditions." It is because of the rapid socio-economic changes particularly after World War II (because of accelerated capitalist developments leading to a breakdown of such historically grown diversities, one should say) that social contacts led to hostilities, prejudice and minority discriminations. The author concludes "that ethnic boundaries do not depend on cultural differences on the level of form, but rather on culture at a more fundamental level, i.e. specific codification of these differences into complementary statuses which differentiate a population into reference groups, supported by a charter of distinctive origins for each. The reason for the existence of such organizations must therefore be sought in the social processes which allow an initial and natural fear and suspicion against strangers to be systematized into ethnic statuses." In other words and without, hopefully, simplifying a complex problem to the point of illegitimacy: it took less than 300 years to produce a different ethnic identity within one and the same people and less than a few decades of capitalist penetration to turn such ethnic diversities into a majority-minority conflict which appears to the participants or the "actors" involved as a prehistoric, genuine value conflict, in structural terms not at all different from so many other racial conflicts.

11. The peculiar cases of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia

As indicated earlier, there was one important and fertile analytical debate on minorities against a specific political background (the reshuffling of the European state system after World War 1) which has largely been forgotten and which needs to be rediscovered and extended to cover the new dimensions as they emerged during the recent decade, i.e. the Marxist discussion at the beginning of this century. This debate ended, for reasons not to be discussed here, with the stabilization of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during the mid-1920s as a centralized territorial state (which it was not meant to be or to become according to the world revolutionary expectations of the first Bolshevik generation). Aiming at an even and equal (as opposed to unequal capitalist) economic development of all the different nationalities of this huge territory and conscious of the dynamite inherent in the national question as a social question, the Soviet state--the "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics"--seemed to have solved at least this one issue, even if at the price of not realizing a qualitatively new, socialist mode of production. And yet, not only but increasingly so during the last few years we read in the press, usually hidden among the shorter notices, of Georgian or Ukrainian "nationalists" condemned to death for bombings or other acts of terrorism against central state institutions; we read of spokesmen for the Crimean Tartars being sent to psychiatric hospitals; we read of protests against cultural "russification" policies and of nationalist underground activities.²³ A look behind the scenes reveals only too soon remarkable differences in economic development, in per capita income, in industrialization, etc. that exist between the various Soviet republics in general and between the RSFSR and most of the other republics (Lithuania being the one outstanding exception) in particular. And, furthermore, the gap in the level of development seems to be widening in certain cases rather than diminishing: according to one calculation it can be concluded "that, if the 1958-65 trend were to continue unchanged into the future /i.e. a more "optimistic" assessment, E.K./, the equalization of the non-Russian republics, taken together, with the level of Russia could be attained only by the year 2170. If, however, the long-range trend prevails--that of 1913-65--the two levels would never meet, for the Russian output would grow by 7.9 per cent a year and that of the non-Russian republics by only 7 per cent." It would go far beyond the limited scope of this analysis to offer a convincing interpretation of this phenomenon of unequal economic development under the conditions of a centrally

planned, non-capitalist (but certainly also non-socialist) economy. But a hypothetical answer should be justified and in order: regional economic inequality seems to be the price paid for competitive economic growth, i.e. for competition with and within the still dominant world capitalist system on the terms as laid down by the latter.²⁴

It is the integration (or the re-integration dictated by world-wide circumstances) into the international capitalist system which seems to be responsible for the reemergence of ethnic conflicts where they seemed to be in the process of "withering away." Such at least seems to be the case as well in that other danger spot, Yugoslavia, whose leadership has probably made one of the most ambitious attempts so far to overcome ethnic hostilities (and which European region is richer in those than the Balkan?) by means of political decentralization and by keeping alive, in principle at least, the marxist hypothesis that there exists a reverse proportional relationship between self-determination and state organization. Trying to grant such self-determination to its various nationalities but, at the same time, opting for (or being forced into) closer economic relations with Western Europe, Yugoslavia saw its internal regional inequalities begin to revive during the 1960s and '70s with the tragic result of a revival of nationalist egotism (e.g. the money inflow into Slovenia from emigrant workers in Austria and W. Germany) to which the government of the Federation could not but react with repression and a re-strengthening of the central state administration.

12. A political conclusion

It seems to be repetitious to draw even more generalized conclusions than were implicit in the analyses of the various cases presented here. That more and more differentiated research is required, particularly within the framework of peace research, is obvious to the point of being banal. But such differentiated analysis must not and should never lose sight and perspective of the real problems raised by the rapid emergence of minorities as a political force in recent years: these movements are the result of social inequalities, and the apparent discriminations they are fighting against can be overcome in the long run only by overcoming those essential inequalities. This, in turn, means to attack the root causes of unequal access to or control over the means of reproduction which will have to be sought in the social formations created by the capitalist mode of production on a world scale.²⁵ And, as a corollary, it is the territorial nation state itself which will always have to be focused

upon as that political-organizational form that sanctifies social inequalities. From this follows that state solutions to minority discrimination in the form of secessions can, at best, be seen by the militants of these movements as intermediate, transitional solutions and not as ends in themselves. If this affirmation needs any more proof, then it is the tragic case of the State of Israel, where the historically probably most consistently and cruelly persecuted minority tried to save itself-only to create with the expulsion and colonization of the Palestinians both internal as well as external minority problems on a scale of frustration and hatred that has led to a renewed spiral of world-wide violence without any end in sight.²⁶

SOURCE NOTES

1. Cf. Stanley Diamond, "Who Killed Biafra?" The New York Review of Books, Vol. XIV, No. 4, Feb. 26, 1970, pp. 17-27.
2. In fact, it is the very process of scholarly differentiation, easily observable in the spread of academic activities, in the frightening, exponential growth rate of books, articles, conference papers, etc. on any social science subject that has contributed rather heavily to the impotence of academic research with regard to alternative solutions anywhere, with Peace Research as one of the more prominent examples of this syndrome.
3. Bernard Doerdelmann (Hsg.). Minderheiten in der Bundesrepublik. München: Deip, 1969. Cf. also the more confusing than stimulating essays by Jean-Francois Lyotard, Das Patchwork der Minderheiten (transl. from the French) Berlin: Merve, 1977.
4. Cf. most recently and most stimulating Perry Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism. London: New Left Books, 1974.
5. Besides Schmoller, Hintze, Sombart, Heller and others, see most of all Max Weber, Political Sociology.
6. Cf. the strictly etymological study of Paul Ludwig Weinacht, Staat. Studien zur Bedeutungsgeschichte des Wortes von der Anfängen bis ins 19. Jahrhundert. Berlin 1968.
7. For both a systematic as well as empirical treatment of this process, cf. Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State. London: New Left Books, 1974.
8. Unless indicated otherwise, all of the cases and data cited above have been collected from German, English and Italian newspapers over the last two years. Besides, I have consulted Rudolf Grulich/Peter Pulse, Nationale Minderheiten in Europa, Opladen: Heggen, 1975; and Tilman Zülch (Hsg.), Von denen keiner spricht. Unterdrückte Minderheiten von der Friedenspolitik vergessen: Kurden, Basken, Chicanos, Indios, Meschier (Sowjetunion) u.a., Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1975.
9. The growth process of political-ideological consciousness from nationalist secessionism to socialism is reflected almost model-like in the evolution of the *Partito Sardo d'Azione* into the *PSd'A Socialista* until its merger, in 1949,

- with the Italian Socialist Party. The fact that it did not merge with the Communist Party reflects also the undogmatic quality of Sardinian socialism with its strong actionist bias, rather than tactical and organizational self-discipline as required by a Leninist party. For a typical biographical account, see Antonello Mattone, Emilio Lussu dal sardinismo al socialismo, Cagliari: EDES, 1976. For one of the first analyses of the recent reemergence of Sardinian revolutionary autonomism, setting the issue precisely within the global context of capitalist colonialism, see Gianfranco Pintore, Sardegna. Regione o colonia? Milano: Mazzotta, 1974.
10. The first etymological dictionary of the Sardinian language appeared in 1973, written by an East German scholar, Max Leopold Wagner of the University of Dresden.
 11. L'avenir de la Bretagne, 14 juin 1975; other publications are BEEIZ; le magazine de la Jeunesse (Rennes), BRETAGNE and Bretagne Expansion (Rennes).
 12. Leopold Kohr, Une Bretagne libre, est-elle viable? Cahiers de l'avenir de la Bretagne, Rennes, 1975.
 13. These and other data, in particular documents on the "cultural revolution" or revival of an Alsatian identity can be found in "Jean," Elsass: Kolonie in Europa, Berlin: Wagenbach, 1976.
 14. For lack of space (and available material) another and similar cultural revival movement, aiming at undermining the hegemony of the French ruling class can only be mentioned here: the Occitanians in the south of France whose culture (they never were an organized nation) was destroyed in the 13th century because they were considered heretics by the Pope and hostile to the King of France; 60,000 men are said to have been massacred at Bdziers in 1209 by the Christian crusaders.
 15. For a systematic treatment see my own book, Internationales System als Geschichte. Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1975.
 16. This case has produced more literature, pamphlets, documentation and historical as well as socio-psychological literature than any other of its kind. Not outstanding as such, but because it is presented in the broader framework of other studies on minorities (Asian, African, Latin American, Japanese, Soviet), I cite here Harold Jackson (ed.): The Fourth World. Victims of Group Oppression. London: Sidgewick & Jackson, 1972, pp. 187-216.
 17. John McGrath, "Scotland: Up Against It," in: Gordon Brown (ed.), The Red Paper on Scotland. EUSPB: Edinburgh, 1975, p. 140. This book might be called a real milestone not only in its analysis of the Scottish question but also in terms of its approach to the problem of regional nationalism in W. Europe. See also Tom Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain, London: New Left Books, 1977. And for the case of Wales see Alan Butt Philip, The Welsh Question. Nationalism in Welsh Politics 1945-1970. Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1975.

18. Marcel Chaput: Why I Am a Separatist. Toronto: The Ryerson Press, 1962, p. 12. An impressive summary of the historical background and of the socio-economic as well as the cultural grievances of the French Canadians can be found in the pamphlet by John Fekete/Victor Rabinovitch/Bonnie Campbell: The Struggle for Quebec, Nottingham: The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1970.
19. Recent articles containing quantitative information are by Walker Conner: "Self Determination: The New Phase" (World Politics, Oct. 1967); "Ethnology and the Peace of South Asia" (World Politics, Oct. 1969); "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying" (World Politics, April 1972). Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl, "Forces of Fragmentation in the International System: The Case of Ethno-Nationalism" (Orbis, Summer 1975, No. 2). Cf. also the quarterly Europa Ethnica, Wien.
20. An exception to this is, of course, the voluminous concern of international and constitutional lawyers during the 1920s and, again, after World War II which had as its frame of reference the League of Nations then and the United Nations later. Suffice it to indicate only two exemplary studies from this group: C.A. Macartney, National States and National Minorities, New York: Russell & Russell, 1968 (1934); and Inis L. Claude, Jr., National Minorities. An International Problem, New York: Greenwood Press, 1969 (1955).
21. The following is a summary of the introductory premise to my paper Migration in the Evolution of the International System, The Johns Hopkins University, Bologna Center - Institute of Foreign Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 16, December 1976, which is based, among others, on N.N. Cheboksarov, Human Races and Populations and V.P. Alexeyev, "The Modes of Race Formation and the Geographical Distribution of the Genes Responsible for Racial Characteristics," in: Races and Peoples. Contemporary Ethnic and Racial Problems, Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1974.

22. Jan-Petter Blom, "Ethnic and Cultural Differentiation," in: Frederick Barth (ed.), Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Social Organization of Cultural Differences, Bergen-Oslo: Universitatsforlaget, 1969 (passages quoted from pp. 74, 77 and 84).
23. One of the few marxist analyses of the national question in today's Soviet Union, written from within, is by Ivan Dzuba, Internationalism or Russification? A Study in the Soviet Nationalities Problem, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968. For data, see, among others, Erich Goldhagen (ed.), Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union (in particular here Vsevolod Aolubnychy, Economic Relations Among the Soviet Republics, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968; and Robert R. King, Minorities Under Communism. Nationalities as a Source of Tension Among Balkan Communist States, Harvard University Press, 1973).
24. Cf. the essays in Egbert Jahn (ed.), Sozioökonomische Bedingungen der sowjetischen Aussenpolitik, Frankfurt/M.: Campus 1975 (English translation in preparation); and the respective chapters in my own recent books Internationales System als Geschichte and Internationale Beziehungen als Wissenschaft, Frankfurt/M.: Campus, 1975 and 1977.
25. As a typical example for a whole school of research which is completely blind to the root causes of minority discrimination and the violence springing from it, see Robin M. Williams, Jr., The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions. A Survey of Research on Problems of Ethnic, Racial, and Religious Group Relations, New York: Social Science Research Council, 1947. On the other hand, we should also note at least one positive example of a basically correct treatment of the issue by Michel Bassand: "The Jura Problem," in JPR, Vol. 12, 1975, pp. 139-150. The Case of Switzerland, i.e. the most prominent case of a three- (if not four-) cultural state without significant social conflicts along ethnic lines would certainly be worth an in-depth investigation in the context of the framework and the hypotheses presented here. Further valuable analyses can be found in William Barclay/Krishna Kumar/Ruth P. Simms (eds.): Racial Conflict, Discrimination & Power: Historical and Contemporary Studies, New York: AMS Press, 1976.
26. It has been generally overlooked that the well-known acts of political terrorism taking place in West Germany in September/October 1977, which mark a qualitative jump in the involutory process towards a more repressive, authori

tarian state under the welcome pretext of measures against this terrorism (and which, in turn, are likely to produce still more political violence) are intrinsically related to the Palestinians' fight for survival: the four "Mogadishu-hijackers" were survivors of the 1975 massacre of the refugee camp Tall el Zaatar.