

*Neo-Nationalism and International Politics**

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In the years that followed Stalin's death the world pattern appeared to be one of a temporary lessening of tension, born of Soviet weakness and destined eventually to harden into the familiar East-West antagonism once the two blocs had consolidated their position. Today, after a decade, that period can be seen as the prelude to wider and profounder movements and shiftings of the world's political scenery. To analyse and understand these calls for decidedly more intellectual effort and a greater capacity for shades of thought than have been demanded of us during the Cold War phase now nearing its end. An awareness of this fact has, of course, been slowly but steadily dawning in the minds of many politicians, diplomats and observers of world affairs: it is probably not too much to assert that in Germany, for the first time since the War, something like a public foreign policy debate is taking shape. Foreign policies and international relations are starting to become themes for working parties and groups with political leanings, and the Universities, too, are finding that their Chairs of Political Science have so far criminally neglected these subjects. All the more reason, then, to welcome the fact that such a discussion is now beginning and that attempts are being made to analyse the factors which have brought about a transformation obvious to all: for as a result we may well be led to review our own policy and to give it a new slant.

It is a permissible simplification to divide the twenty-year post-War period, now drawing to a close, into two fairly clearcut parts, the line of separation running roughly through the mid-50's. The first ten years were characterized by the assump-

tion that there was an antagonistic and irremediable contrast between West and East, Capitalism and Communism, the Western system of alliances and the Soviet-controlled bloc, the USA and the USSR. What marked these ten years was above all the specific way in which *the conflict was defined*. For any given policy it is of decisive importance how a state of tension, universally acknowledged to exist, is defined, i.e. where its cause is believed to lie. The causes of this first half of the Cold War were seen-at least in the West-as lying in the military power politics and expansionist trend of the Soviet Union; that is to say, the East-West conflict was defined as primarily of *a military* character. Whatever the rights and wrongs of this belief, the definition resulted in a practical policy, the policy of military armament, the maximum proliferation of bi- and multilateral alliances and the development of a strategy whose underlying premise was the need to ensure the military defence of those territories and sub-continent which had not (as yet) fallen victims to the Communist urge for conquest. For detailed proof of this terse contention we need look no further than the foreign policy-wholly decisive for the attitude of the Western world-pursued by the USA and its leaders, and it finds a tangible echo in NATO, the *Bundeswehr* (Armed Forces of the German Federal Republic) and the Dulles-Graze for collecting alliances.

The second half of the Cold War, beginning in the mid-1950's, was outwardly characterized by greater flexibility in the foreign policy pursued by the post-Stalin USSR, the maximum development of an enormous American arms machine, the military consolidation of the two blocs and

the slow rise to international prominence of non-European States hitherto dependent colonies or politically insignificant. There was, however, a subtle but important change in the definition of the conflict. The undisputed doctrine of the 1920's-namely that the Communist menace was essentially *a social* conflict-again became fashionable, not least from rival desires to curry favour and gain influence with the developing countries. Thus the struggle was now seen as only partly, and in no wise mainly, as a military dispute, but rather first and foremost a social and ideological competition to shape the future. This realization gained credence in the USA-more slowly in Government and policy-framing circles, strongly in the Universities and among writers on current affairs; it also became accepted theory in Germany. The heavier accent on Marx and Marxism in the latter half of the 50's reflects this new trend; yet the re-appraisal or re-interpretation led to no decisive change in official policy, nor could it do so, since even this nicer definition of the conflict, tending to place it on a higher plane, failed to shatter the still unquestioned hypothesis of the antagonism between the Eastern and Western systems. There was little chance of shattering it because the international situation itself-including the monolithic stability of the Eastern bloc, from aggressive threats over Berlin to bombardments of Quemoy and Matsu under Soviet cover from the rear-and the as yet only vaguely-glimpsed trends of the Afro-Asian world appeared not to call for any new approach likely to strike at the very roots of the Cold War philosophy.

Both intellectually and from the standpoint of world politics, however, the last phase of the second half of the Cold War carried within itself the means of escaping from its toils. Intellectually the way was opened by the forthright preachings of such wise students of the international scene as George F. Kennan and, on a broader basis, by the quick reactions of social and political scientists (chiefly

American) writing on the conditions and possibilities of the developing countries, which had rightly been attracting more and more political interest during those years. A belief that the world was no longer comprehensible on the lines of a bi-polar system had already gained adherents in the USA in the later Eisenhower epoch, but there was a need in general for a new Government and in particular for Kennedy's capacity to surround himself with advisers who were politically sensitive and intellectually trained, if the path was to be cleared for new thinking and a new policy. What especially illuminates the latter half of the second post-War decade is the re-assessment of the developing countries, largely inspired by the teachings of American social science: a growing awareness that these countries, despite intensive efforts by both camps, despite economic aid with political strings, despite the blandishments of Eastern and Western ideological propaganda, are not ready to turn either Communist or Capitalist. Not ready - or perhaps one should rather say "not in a position". The task which the young elites of these countries have set themselves, namely the transformation of their socially, economically and culturally backward and stagnant societies into modern industrial States, is found in practice to be vastly more complex and long-term than was generally believed. For the assumption that the process would be rapid was held, firstly, by Western political theorists, who imagined that a centuries-old gap could be closed by an ambitious and extensive economic aid programme, through the mere transfer of Western capitalistic forms of business practice and management; secondly, by the Communists, who thought that after decolonization there would be a relatively brief nationalistic phase of transition to Communism; and finally by the rising elites of the new nations themselves, who see their impatient ambitions everywhere confronted with pre-industrial attitudes in the majority of the population, attitudes which

even leaders trained to expound the virtues of centralized government, for all their proselytizing zeal, are scarcely able to change. In almost all the developing countries it may generally be observed that it is traditional value-judgments, behaviour patterns and ways of life, and not least religions, which tend to weaken, to break or to overpower the revolutionary drive and the anti-traditional urge for modernization.

Many sincere optimists are awakening to the bitter truth that cultural change, transformation forced on adult societies by an administrative machine, is a much more lengthy and complicated process than was generally imagined. The Belgian Congo, with its tribal feuds, is only one extreme but significant example. Another is the enthusiastically-launched project of the Kennedy Government known as the *Alianza para Progreso*, designed to free the Latin-American sub-continent within ten years (1) from its own economic shackles. Now that this great programme has already run half its appointed course, it must be considered to have failed principally, though not solely, because of the cultural obstacle represented by a stubborn social structure, with roots deeper than expected. What Kennedy would have been unable to avoid Johnson has reluctantly had to accept-foreign aid, as an effective means of attaining long-term political objectives, has had to be reduced. In this respect the Soviet Union has been showing an increasing tendency to adopt the 'Order arms!' position, and it seems doubtful whether the coalition of seventyfive developing countries, which has begun to take a hand in the game since the close of the United Nations Trade and Development Conference in June, can bring any real pressure to bear on the large industrial countries that might induce them to cease their flirtations with a policy of economic disengagement.

But what has been said of the developing countries is equally true-and this is perhaps the real lesson to be learnt from

the experience of recent years-of the older Powers. If there is an unquestionable tendency towards a dissolution of the larger power-blocs based on political ideologies, the most astounding and most important feature of this is found in the preliminary symptoms that accompany the process: the first rumblings of *national independence and particularism*. The serious rift between China and the Soviet Union is surely-unless all appearances are deceptive-primarily the result of cultural and historical divergencies, differing philosophies, traditional foreign policies, the egotisms of the two elites and, deeper still, the opposing positions of the nations themselves; the common (adopted) ideology continues to hold the two rivals loosely together but will probably not do so much longer. The indications that Roumania will soon break out of the charmed circle are also precursors of an assertion of national integrity; similar things happened to Yugoslavia and will happen to others. To the extent that in the past the rigorous bloc policy of the Soviets succeeded in eliminating obsolete national frontiers and, through the centrally-directed internationalism of unscrupulous Party leaderships in creating large areas of well-ordered and State-run society, freed of national conflicts for a long time to come, it certainly had

some admirers: yet even these must today be sadly wondering what was the point of all the widespread terror and political sacrifices if the result was not even to overcome this single long-standing evil of nationalism *über Alles*. Antagonistic nationalisms have always been interpreted as the product of a social order based on free-economy Capitalism, and their eradication was, and is, one of the essential aims of the Communist Revolution and its blueprint for a new world. However respectable and well-founded the Marxist definition of the conflict was, and may still be, in the minds and actions of its best disciples it is increasingly shown up as tragically naive. Both the conclusions drawn from the subtler arguments of

social anthropologists, and the concrete phenomena of 'polycentrism' - itself merely a camouflage term for failure to set up a supra-national unity in the Eastern bloc, in which relations between the peoples were to have reached a higher qualitative level-permit of the deduction that the change in conditions of ownership, whether alone or as a prime factor, has not brought in its train any noticeable change in group consciousness, i.e. in traditional behaviour patterns and value-judgments. For example, in the GDR economic and political conditions certainly differ radically from those in the Federal Republic; yet everything that is least pleasant in the German national character - authoritarianism, bureaucracy, petty bourgeoisie, official arrogance, love of uniforms, incivility, a lack of humour-all these appear, over there, to be as rife as ever, if not more so. Whatever may be said of the GDR as a mere Soviet colony, there is every reason for affirming that is nevertheless a specifically German or even Prussian form of Communism.

But the astonishing capacity for survival shown by traditional behaviour patterns, social structures and self-assertions can be observed not only in areas where a largescale attempt to change the system is carried out with brutal thoroughness: we also find it on this side of the Iron Curtain. However strongly present-day France may be stamped by the personality of de Gaulle, his appeal to national pride seems in fact to strike a chord in a latent readiness, long unsatisfied, to become identified with De-nationalist sentiments, an attitude to which he indeed gives articulate form but which he has not simply conjured out of thin air. De Gaulle represents more than just de Gaulle himself: he reflects a Western phenomenon which parallels what has happened in the East, namely the failure of efforts to create a supra-national unit through the medium of the European idea, with the ultimate object of providing the peoples with a stable, reliable and increasingly profound basis for identifying

themselves as Europeans. The formation of the Coal and Steel Community, Euratom, the EEC and so forth has not gone hand in hand with a European consciousness transcending national frontiers: rather is the trend in the opposite direction. The intensification of communications media within Europe-foreign travel, news ser-' vices, cultural exchanges, political consultations, Council of Europe-has failed to produce that consciousness; national characteristics, behaviour patterns, attitudes, value-judgments and interests have proved to be constant to a degree scarcely predictable after the tragic events of the Second World War, and hidden during the 1950's behind the common defence front of anti-Communism.

Everywhere we may observe the phenomenon of re-awakening nationalism, perhaps better paraphrased as *the failure of attempts to break doom national cultural behaviour patterns in favour of embracing collective systems covering large areas*; or it may be viewed as the amazing consistency of traditional identifications despite cataclysms of the most appalling nature. This is true of the 'old nations of Europe, the USA and Asia, just as it is of the 'new' countries in the Near East or Africa. Nasser's appeal, just as much as Nkrumah's, has hitherto fallen an deaf ears.

These facts are a cause of bitterness and disappointment to many. They have an even more tragic side when viewed in the context of the associated racial tensions so increasingly widespread in the world today. It is spine-chilling to see how *China*, in its quarrel with the Soviet Union, more and more frequently and systematically drags in racial arguments. *Cyprus*, where ethnic and cultural differences between population groups that have lived peaceably together for centuries with only a minimum of social and economic disparities have suddenly assumed the magnitude of blood-feuds, is another example. We could also mention *South Africa*, where the racial situation is in the long

run probably the most menacing of all, or *Southern Rhodesia*, and the imminent expulsion of non-African coloured minorities from East Africa. Against the existence of Pakistan externally, and against the growing fanaticism of ethnic and religious groups within, *India* is fighting a desperate rearguard action for its own preservation and meaningful existence as a secular State. In spite of being almost fifty years old, in spite of its exploitation of every weapon of power politics and ideology, the *Soviet Union* has still not succeeded in stamping out anti-Semitism - the honourable and, to many Socialists outside the USSR, still valid theory that the change in the conditions of production, or the liquidation of the capitalist class society, would spell the end of ethnic and religious tensions, seems here not to have been confirmed, painful though the admission may be. We even hear that the people of *Israel*, who have surely suffered more than any other from religious, racial and nationalistic fanatics, not only show signs of growing ethnic and cultural tensions among them

themselves, but have also-clandestinely as yet - manifested collective prejudice against the Arabs in their own country. *Czechoslovakia* seems further removed than ever from integrating the Slovak part of its population in an over-all political union; in *Canada* we note increasing tension between the English-speaking majority and the French-speaking minority, already coming near to a civil war with terrorist activities and threats of assassinations-and this at the very moment when the Government is endeavouring, through the introduction of a new flag containing Canadian national emblems, to create something like a Canadian consciousness. Nor should we forget the great *American* democracy itself, which after 300 years of settlement in common, after nearly 200' years of independent political existence and 100 years of legal emancipation, has still not managed to incorporate the coloured minority of barely 20 million negroes as a

genuine part of the nation - rather is it the case that the tensions and mistrust between the dominant white culture and the black sub-culture that is gradually awakening to self-awareness are becoming greater and greater and threatening to plunge the whole nation into a dangerous paralysis from which there will be no way out. Last, but not least, from little *Switzerland* we hear that the Catholic "Jurassiens" are reviving a conflict, long thought to be ended, with the Protestants of the Canton of Berne and are urging cantonal selfgovernment.

All these, of course, are widely diverse phenomena which it would no doubt be an impermissible simplification to reduce to a common denominator. It could rightly be objected that the social oppression of South African blacks cannot be simply lumped together with religious persecution in South Vietnam or racial conflicts in British Guiana. Yet differentiate as one may, correctly attributing some of the responsibility for outbreaks of ethnic and racial tension to differences in social and economic status, the sad truth remains that elimination of the latter has not led to the disappearance of the former in the few cases where luck or sound political leadership has created the right conditions. The one big exception appears to be the Latin-American sub-continent, where the sharp class divisions are surprisingly not coloured by racial or ethnic criteria, or scarcely so. One of the most important tasks of social scientists and anthropologists might well be to analyse the conditions that have brought this situation about and to examine whether they could be transposed to other cultures and other continents.

It is clear that there must be new prerequisites and prospects for policy in general, and foreign policy in particular, as a result of the changing world pattern just described. The issue can now not be bilked: there are abundant and everincreasing signs of national, ethnic and racial identifications, of traditional value-

judgements or cultural behaviour patterns long believed to be outdated or consigned to oblivion. In the short term it may well be an effective policy, though in the long term it will be dangerous, to gamble an 'polycentrism' in the Eastern bloc and to expect some 'softening-up' through the encouragement of national independence for the Soviet satellites. President Kennedy set the tone for this in what was probably his most important foreign policy speech, at Washington University in June 1963, when he expressly appealed to the Soviet Union to look to her national Russian interests, which he claimed were less incompatible than they seemed with those of America. Since then American policy towards the Communist bloc has been working with greater intensity in the direction of lessening it by appealing to the national interests of the satellites-and not without success, as may be seen from the example of Roumania, which for reasons of national prestige is resisting closer integration in the Comecon.

There is, however, a contradiction here with the simultaneous pronouncements on European/Atlantic interdependence, and it only serves to strengthen the mistrust felt by America's European partners, who are in any case looking to their own special national interests, for a bi-lateral Soviet-American 'gentlemen's agreement' which in practice already goes quite a long way. There is a further contradiction with American policy in, for instance, South-East Asia, where the threat from Communist China takes second place to the chief aim of those countries, namely to organize themselves on an independent national basis, even if this is *a de facto* impossibility outside the Chinese sphere of influence. The barely suppressed satisfaction at apparent polycentric tensions in the Communist bloc should delude no one into forgetting that this policy is playing with fire - a fire which burns much more dangerously in the West itself, or in parts of the world for which we are also responsible. It threatens European unity, it threat

ens the Atlantic Community, it threatens North Africa, it threatens to drag the world into a sanguinary struggle in South Africa, it threatens the USA from Latin America - and it threatens, despite their vast economic predominance, to isolate America and Europe psychologically, culturally and hence, on the long view, politically, from the non-White majority of the world. It is impossible not to sympathize with the impromptu, and politically clumsy, remark by Khrushchev in Egypt when he stigmatized Pan-Arabism as a dangerous and reactionary catchword and rightly asked: 'Where would that leave us Russians?' The encouragement of national aspirations to independence in the Eastern bloc itself cannot fail to have hazardous consequences on Western or European unity and, even more, will tend to fan the divergent nationalisms and ethnic or racial antagonisms in most parts of the world: it is a boomerang which will hit us harder than any short-term tendencies to blocloosening are worth.

Above all, the threat is a sinister one because it is charged with military implications and will soon be nuclear as well. If it is an established fact that many hopes have been dashed: the Western hopes of a liberal economy; the expectations of the Communist East, based on economic and ideological considerations, that national cultural contradictions could be overcome by a change in socio-economic structures; and if it is clear that the way to 'one world' or 'one humanity' is much broader and longer than might reasonably have been thought, surely all this reflects little credit on the responsibility, far-sightedness and sensitivity of the leaders of foreign policy. What they need-what all of us need-is a clear realization of the long-term effects of promoting national interests with a view to weakening the Soviet Union and the sphere of its dominion-not forgetting, either, that such a policy will also have repercussions on the coherence of the West and the efforts to eliminate its national differences. For example, it is by no means

certain, it is even improbable, that a nationalistic Poland is a better partner for the present Federal Republic of Germany than a Poland disciplined by the *raison d'etat* of the Eastern bloc. Then, too, a responsible political leadership must do all in its power to prevent the growing regional tensions from becoming charged with ever greater military implications. The danger of a spread of nuclear weapons potential to a dozen countries within the next ten years is graver and more real than we will perhaps admit: China, India, Egypt and Israel, each of them a keen contender for regional power, are today all acknowledged to possess technical possibilities for atomic arms production -and they will be followed by others. It is one thing to be a 'realist' and come to terms with the fact that the two superPowers, the USA and the Soviet Union, already have such weapons in their hands: it is another thing to ponder realistically the consequences of a demand for atomic weapons for third or fifth countries which hitherto did not have' their fingers on the trigger. The theory that large-scale multilateral armament is a deterrent to warfare has once already been proved-in World War I-to be a tragic error. At most the 'atomic stalemate' between USSR and USA rendered possible-as we now see in retrospect-a period of relative stability and security.

What is wanted for both the near and the distant future is a policy which will provide machinery, *not* for the proliferation of atomic weapons within military alliances that are in any case getting shaky, but for the strict and uncompromising limitation of atomic weapons to the two existing military Great Powers or their Governments. Now that the Cold War, which enabled us to obtain a relatively general view of international conflicts, is over, now that the large blocs are falling apart and the world more and more splitting up into racial, ethnic and nationalist rivalries, it is heaping fuel recklessly on to an already smouldering fire to demand

nuclear weapons casually for brittle supra-national institutions such as the MLF. And what is true of nuclear weapons in general is especially true of arms deliveries and military training aid to young nations, in which the West has been excelling itself. It is a wicked hark-back to the 1950's to continue defining the present conflicts in military terms in the light of the supposed experiences of the Cold War and, for instance, to debit development funds so heavily, as America did during those years, with military training and weapons assistance; the recent share of the Federal Republic, too, in such practices in developing countries cannot but have nefarious results in the long run in the form of an increase in regional tensions. Rather should the policy-makers and the social scientists, jointly and severally, try to ascertain how the present trend towards socio-cultural tensions, which waxes more than it wanes, can be so channelled as to prevent escalation into local skirmishes, regional armed conflicts and ultimately international catastrophes.

World politics have become harder rather than easier with the ending of the Cold War. The relaxation of tension, now that the iron grip of the two super-Powers on their satellites has loosened, is accompanied by the risk of international chaos much more than by hope of world peace. But the new situation also contains a fruitful challenge to our thinking and our policy. If it be true that we are entering a period of greater complexity so far as the international community is concerned, a period in which the price to be paid for the disappearance of the danger of a nuclear clash between the leaders of the two large blocs is the budding danger of multi-regional chaos, then the challenge lies in two lines of action, precisely *because* national and traditional identifications and symbols have proved to be so stable: *first*, an effort must be made to divest international tensions of their potential explosiveness through a policy of systematic

control and limitation of armaments, beginning at home; and *secondly*, these tensions must be lessened by action at their sources, namely internal policy, the constitution of society, and education.

To this end, however, we need *a new definition of the conflict*-a definition in which military and socio-economic factors in the narrower sense give way to ethnic and cultural variables. The dawning realization, both in the USA and in the Soviet Union, that more and better armaments have *not* led to a lessening of tension and hence are not productive of greater security, and the foregoing indications that social and economic change (forced or otherwise) has only minimal power to transform traditional consciousness and collective attitudes-all this is

unquestionably a debit balance. But it is a balance which must be ascribed to an inadequate definition of the conflict, an inadequate knowledge of the dynamics of international tensions or of their social origins, which are more complicated to understand. Both the traditional interpretation of international conflicts in terms of power politics, and their more recent interpretation according to the Marxist ethos, have proved unworkable as a means of solving the problems of the second half of the century. Every attempt to solve them must, however, be based on one fundamental assumption, namely that *peace* is not only necessary but must also be possible.

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